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Abstract
This document is a review of five documents on information assurance
from the Department of Defense (DoD), namely 5200.40, 8510.1-M, 8500.1,
8500.2, and an “interim” document on DIACAP [9].  The five documents
divide into three sets: (1) 5200.40 & 8510.1-M, (2) 8500.1 & 8500.2, and (3)
the interim DIACAP document.  The first two sets describe the
certification and accreditation process known as “DITSCAP”; the last two
sets describe the certification and accreditation process known as
“DIACAP” (the second set applies to both processes).  Each set of
documents describes (1) a process, (2) a systems classification, and (3) a
measurement standard.  Appendices in this report (a) list the Phases,
Activities, and Tasks of DITSCAP, (b) note the discrepancies between
5200.40 and 8510.1-M concerning DITSCAP Tasks and the System Security
Authorization Agreement (SSAA), (c) analyze the DIACAP constraints on
role fusion and on reporting, (d) map terms shared across the documents,
and (e) review three additional documents on information assurance,
namely DCID 6/3, NIST 800-37, and COBIT®.
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confidentiality, integrity, availability.
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1  Introduction
This section first provides context for information assurance at the DoD and then proceeds with
the “evolving story.”
1.1  Context
DITSCAP is the current certification and accreditation (C&A)—both terms are defined below—
process for the DoD.  DIACAP is a new process that has not yet been officially signed at the
DoD Secretary level: DIACAP is currently in “interim” status.  The Intelligence Community
within the federal government uses a different process, described in DCID 6/3 [8].  FISMA [11]
mandates the development of C&A documents for non-DoD and non-intelligence-community
systems.  NIST SP 800-37, -53, and -60 ([24], [25], and [26]), as a group, fulfill that mandate, as
shown in Table 1.  The focus of this document is on C&A for the DoD.
1.2  The Evolving Story
This document focuses on five information assurance (IA) documents from the Department of
Defense (DoD).  For ease of reference this document uses tags for those documents, as shown in
Table 2 below.
Table 1 Federal C&A
Federal entitya
a. Appendix E.3 beginning on page 74 herein describes an example of what the
private sector could use for C&A.
C&A process
or document(s) that
describes that process
Comments
DoD DITSCAP/DIACAP
Intelligence
community DCID 6/3
See Appendix E.1 beginning
on page 67 herein for more
information.
Other federal
agencies
OMB A-130,
NIST SP 800-37, -53, -60
See Appendix E.2 beginning
on page 72 herein for more
information.
Table 2 Document Tags  (Sheet 1 of 2)
Tag Document
5200.40
Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5200.40, December 30, 1997,
SUBJECT: DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accredita-
tion Process (DITSCAP).  68 pages.
8510.1-M
Department of Defense Information Technology Security Certification and
Accreditation Process (DITSCAP).  Application Manual.  July 31, 2000.  157
pages.9
The first two documents—5200.40 and 8510.1-M—present the DoD Information Technology
Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP).  The next two documents—8500.1
and 8500.2—are used both by DITSCAP and the DoD Information Assurance Certification and
Accreditation Process (DIACAP).  The last document—Interim-DIACAP—presents the DoD
Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP), as depicted in
Figure 1.
The documents do not reflect two alternatives to certification and accreditation (C&A) so much
as they reflect a transition that suggests an evolving story which becomes evident if we note
that Interim-DIACAP cancels both 5200.40 and 8510.1-M (Interim-DIACAP, pages 1 & 11)1 and
8500.1 Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER 8500.1, October 24, 2002, SUB-JECT: Information Assurance (IA).  25 pages.
8500.2 Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 8500.2, February 6, 2003,SUBJECT: Information Assurance (IA) Implementation.  102 pages.
Interim-DIACAPa [9]
a. The “Interim-DIACAP” term is intended to help distinguish the July 6, 2006 document [9] and the DIACAP process itself. An
earlier version of the document bore the number “8510.bb.”
Figure  1 DITSCAP & DIACAP
1.  Because DIACAP is not yet approved, neither 8500.1 nor 8500.2 reference DIACAP, as we would expect.  However, if and when
DIACAP is approved, we can expect that new versions of both 8500.1 and 8500.2 will be released, with references to DITSCAP
replaced with references to DIACAP.
Table 2 Document Tags  (Sheet 2 of 2)
Tag Document
DITSCAP DIACAP
5200.40
8510.1-M
8500.1
8500.2
Interim-DIACAP10
if we map the five documents to their publication dates, as shown in Figure 2.
All five of the documents are concerned with C&A.  5200.40 emphasizes a step-by-step
approach using a document called the “System Security Authorization Agreement” (SSAA)
which is used to record and guide actions that will provide IA throughout the system life-cycle.
By extrapolation, some time prior to 5200.40 the approach to IA may have been a one-time
review—a “fire and forget” approach.  If that is the case, then 5200.40 may have been the
document that introduced the idea of maintaining IA throughout the life-cycle.
8510.1-M introduces the use of questions by which IA could be established. These questions are
organized into Checklists for different areas, such as “System Architecture Analysis” and
“Software, Hardware, and Firmware Design Analysis.”  In addition, 8510.1-M introduces
“levels” corresponding to the degree of IA needed: Level 1 systems requires minimal IA, Level 4
system requires maximum IA, and Level 2 and Level 3 require intermediate IA.
8500.1 and 8500.2 introduce “IA Controls”2 which are similar in scope to the questions
introduced in 8510.1-M but are objectives instead.  That is, an IA Control describes what the
relevant safeguards and activities should provide.
Finally, Interim-DIACAP introduces the concept of placing the IA Controls at the focal point of
the provision of IA, so the story continues.  Meanwhile, a similar evolution may be unfolding
within the intelligence community: the Director of National Intelligence is in the middle of a
“re-vitalization” of C&A.3
1.3  Principles
The principles underlying DITSCAP and DIACAP stem from the basis of their respective
Figure  2 Transition
2.  See Section 3.2.3 on page 27 below for a definition of “IA Control.”
3.  See http://www.dni.gov/dniwww/C&A.html.
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approaches.  The principles are similar but different, which is just as we would expect, given
that the latter seems to have evolved from the former.  Both DITSCAP and DIACAP are
concerned with C&A and both are concerned with the Production phase of a system’s life-cycle,
but the principles themselves are not the same.  DITSCAP rests on two principles:
1. IA is established via agreement between the four people who assume the four, key roles.
2. IA requires attention not only during a system’s Design and Development Phases but also
during its Production Phase.
DIACAP also rests on two principles:
1. IA is established via IA Controls.
1. IA Controls need to be maintained.
DIACAP’s principles are more precise, and their focus on IA Controls is more obvious.
DIACAP thus leans toward frameworks such as CoBiT (see Appendix E.3). In a similar vein BSI
[1] provides a set of safeguards to counter various threats, where the threats are grouped for
products, such as Lotus Notes.  ISO 15408 [13]4 presents a catalogue of security functions, a
catalogue of assurance requirements, and a method of grouping items from both catalogues so
that the effectiveness of a “component or system” ([23], page 4) can be evaluated based on a
given grouping.
The reason for the evolution from DITSCAP to DIACAP is clear.  The Global Information Grid
(GIG)5 requires standardization of protection levels for systems that interconnect, and the DoD
anticipates that almost everything will eventually interconnect.  This implies that there should
be a standard for determining a protection level to enable uniformity across interconnections.
The standard that DIACAP provides is the set of baseline IA Controls specified in 8500.2.
So in general DITSCAP is an agreement-based approach and DIACAP is a compliance-based
approach.  DITSCAP also uses compliance and DIACAP also uses agreement, but in both cases
these are subsidiary.
1.4  Document Sets
The five documents divide into three sets of documents:
•5200.40 & 8510.1-M,
•8500.1 & 8500.2, and
•Interim-DIACAP [9].
All three sets of documents present (or refer to a document that presents)
1. a process,
4.  ISO 15408 is ISO’s adoption of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, colloquially known simply
as the “Common Criteria” [6].
5.  The GIG is described in 8500.2, E2.1.21, page 18 and in Interim-DIACAP, E2.1.29, page 17.  The “Defense Information Infrastruc-
ture” (DII) is described in 5200.40, E2.1.17, page 9 and 8510.1-M, DL1.1.25, page 11.12
2. a systems classification, and
3. a measurement standard.
The triad for the first set of documents (5200.40 & 8510.1-M) is as follows:
1. the process is DITSCAP
2. the systems classification consists of four levels based on seven characteristics, and
3. the measurement standard is a set of Checklists of questions.
The triad for the second set of documents (8500.1 & 8500.2) is as follows:
1. the process is “the DoD C&A process” (8500.2, pages 43 & 47)6,
2. the systems classification consists of nine elements, based on the Cartesian product of three
“Mission Assurance Categories” (i.e., importance of the system’s integrity and availability
to its mission) and three “Confidentiality Levels,” and
3. the measurement standard is a set of IA Controls.
The triad for the last document (Interim-DIACAP) is as follows:
1. the process is DIACAP,
2. the systems classification is the same as that provided by 8500.1 & 8500.2,
3. the measurement standard is the same as that provided by 8500.1 & 8500.2.
The triad for the three sets of documents are summarized in Table 3 below.
1.5  Organization
The remainder of this report is organized as follows.  In Section 2 the first set of documents is
summarized. In Section 3 the second set of documents is summarized. In Section 4 the third set
6. 8500.2 lists 5200.40 as a reference (reference (n), page 13) and 8500.2 lists “DITSCAP” in its list of acronyms (page 27), but the acro-
nym “DITSCAP” does not appear anywhere else in 8500.2.  8500.2 includes a definition for IA C&A: “E2.1.25. IA Certification and
Accreditation (IA C&A).  The standard DoD approach for identifying information security requirements, providing security solu-
tions, and managing the security of DoD information systems” (page 20).  This would be the logical place to include the DITSCAP
acronym, but it is not present.
Table 3 Document Sets
5200.40 & 8510.1-M 8500.1 & 8500.2 Interim-DIACAP
Process DITSCAP
“the DoD C&A
process” DIACAP
Systems
Classification
Four Levels, based on
seven
characteristics
Nine elements, based on the Cartesian product of
three Mission Assurance Categories (MAC) and
three  Confidentiality Levels
Measurement
Standard
A set of Checklists con-
taining questions A set of IA Controls13
of documents (consisting of only one document) is summarized.
Appendix A lists the DITSCAP Phases, Activities, and Tasks, based on 8510.1-M.
Appendix B notes discrepancies in the list of Phases, Activities, and Tasks provided by 5200.40
and by 8510.1-M.
Appendix C analyzes Interim-DIACAP’s constraints on role fusion and on reporting.
Appendix D lists common terms across  the five documents, as a measure of common focus.
Appendix E summarizes three additional IA documents, the first two from government
agencies (namely the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)), which round out the government view on C&A, and the last
from an international, non-profit organization (namely ISACA).14
2  5200.40 & 8510.1-M
This section first describes DITSCAP, then reviews 5200.40, and then reviews 8510.1-M,
presenting for each (1) the process, (2) the systems classification, and (3) the standard of
measurement provided by each document.
2.1  DITSCAP
DITSCAP is an acronym for “DoD Information Technology Security Certification and
Accreditation Process.”  Note that DITSCAP is a process. The four DITSCAP Phases consist of a
number of “Activities” which, in turn, consist of a number of “Tasks” (a list is shown in
Appendix A beginning on page 45 herein).
DITSCAP is an agreement-based approach.  DITSCAP rests on two principles:
1. IA is established via agreement between the four people who assume the four, key roles.
2. IA requires attention not only during a system’s Design and Development Phases but also
during its Production Phase.
The above principles devolve into the following three operations:
1. Get agreement by all the role-players (i.e., stakeholders) (see Table 4), not just by a set of
experts:
The key to the DITSCAP is the agreement between the IT system program
manager, the DAA, the CA, and the user representative. (5200.40, E3.1.3,
page 16)
2. Get the role-players to produce a formal, written agreement (i.e., the System Security
Authorization Agreement (SSAA)), not just an informal, verbal agreement.
3. Get the role-players to agree at each stage in the system life-cycle, including production,
and not just at the end of development, by using their formal, written agreement dynami-
cally, not statically, adding details to the agreement or changing it as the process progresses.
The purpose of DITSCAP is to establish requirements (Phase 1) and then confirm that the
system complies with those requirements (a) as the system develops and (b) as the system is
maintained during production (Phases 2, 3, and 4).  Both 5100.40 and 8510.1-M use four nouns—
accreditation, certification, validation, and verification—in connection with this process.
Accreditation is the act of accepting a system as certified; certification is the confirmation of
compliance; verification is certification when performed while the system is under development
(and during production); and validation is certification when performed after development has
been completed and before production has begun.  The following are the definitions from
5200.40:
E2.1.2. Accreditation.  Formal declaration by the DAA that an IT system is approved to
operate in a particular security mode using a prescribed set of safeguards at an acceptable
level of risk. (5200.40, page 8)
E2.1.8. Certification. Comprehensive evaluation of the technical and non-technical security
features of an IT system and other safeguards, made in support of the accreditation process,15
to establish the extent that a particular design and implementation meets a set of specific
security requirements. (5200.40, page 8)
E2.1.64. Validation.  Determination of the correct implementation in the completed IT sys-
tem with the security requirements and approach agreed on by the users, acquisition
authority, and the DAA. (5200.40, page 14)
E2.1.65. Verification.  The process of determining compliance of the evolving IT system
specification, design, or code with the security requirements and approach agreed upon by
the users, acquisition authority, and the DAA. (5200.40, page 14)
Table 4 DITSCAP Roles
Roles Abbreviation Responsibilities
Designated
Approving
Authority
DAA
The person who accepts the residual risk
E2.1.18. Designated Approving Authority (DAA or Accredi-
tor).  Official with the authority to formally assume the
responsibility for operating a system or network at an accept-
able level of risk. (5200.40, page 10)
DL1.1.26. Designated Approving Authority (DAA or Accredi-
tor) Official with the authority to formally assume responsibil-
ity for operating a system at an acceptable level of risk.  This
term is synonymous with design accrediting authority and
delegated accrediting authority. (8510.1-M, page 11)
Certification
Authority CA
The technical expert (5200.40, E3.3.4.1, page 23)
E2.1.9. Certification Authority (CA).  The official responsible
for performing the comprehensive evaluation of the technical
and non-technical security features of an IT system and other
safeguards, made in support of the accreditation process, to
establish the extent that a particular design and implementa-
tion meet a set of specified security requirements. (5200.40,
page, 9)
DL1.1.12. Certification Authority (Certifier).  Individual
responsible for making a technical judgement of the system’s
compliance with stated requirements, identifying and assess-
ing the risks associated with operating the system, coordinat-
ing the certification activities, and consolidating the final
certification and accreditation package. (8510.1-M, page 9)
User
Representative (none used)
The person who represents the users (5200.40, E2.1.42, page
12) (8510.1-M, DL1.1.81, page 17)
Program
Manager (none used)
The person who is the focal point of the process
E2.1.42. Program Manager. The person ultimately responsible
for the overall procurement, development, integration, modifi-
cation, or operation and maintenance of the IT system.
(5200.40, page 12).
DL1.1.58. Program Manager.  The person ultimately responsi-
ble for the overall procurement, development, integration,
modification, or operation and maintenance of the IS. (8510.1-
M, page 15)16
As will be explained below, DITSCAP consists of four “Phases.”  These Phases are to be applied
in sequence, with the last Phase continuing through the maintenance part of the lifecycle.
However, if, during any Phase, the “security posture” (undefined) significantly changes, then a
new iteration of the Phases begins, as suggested by Figure 3.
At the coarsest level of granularity, DITSCAP consists of two types of Phases:
•a Definition type, in which the system and the development plan are described and which
happens only once per DITSCAP iteration, and
•a Certification type, which can occur many times per DITSCAP iteration.  DITSCAP is com-
prised of four Phases with the names Definition, Verification, Validation, and Post Accredi-
tation.
The Definition Phase, which is Phase 1, is of the Definition type; the other three Phases—
referred to as Phases 2, 3, and 4—are of the Certification type.
The job of the Definition Phase is the writing of and agreement by the stakeholders to the
“binding” (8510.1-M, C2.1.1.6, page 29) System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA).  The
SSAA is the “basis of agreement” (5200.40, E3.3.5.2, page 25).  It “document[s] the conditions of
C&A” (5200.40, E3.3.5, page 24) and is thus similar to a contract in that the DAA agrees to
accredit (i.e., formally accept) the system if the system passes certification.   At the same time,
the SSAA is unlike a contract in that the DAA does not appear to be required to accredit the
system even if the results of the certification step in Phase 3 are acceptable.  The name that
DITSCAP gives to this first Phase is Definition but the name obscures the contractual nature of
the SSAA.  The intent of the Phase would be clearer if the name were Agreement, for example.
The job of the other three Phases is certification.  DITSCAP partitions the life-cycle into three
parts which we could call development, acceptance, and production.  There is a Phase for each
part, named Verification, Validation, and Post Accreditation, respectively.  Unfortunately, these
names obscure the common theme of certification.  The names also obscure the fact that
Verification is done possibly many times during development but Validation is done only once,
at acceptance. The name Post Accreditation, coming immediately after Validation, suggests that
an Accreditation Phase has been overlooked, until one realizes that Validation is Accreditation,
Figure  3 Iterative Nature of DITSCAP
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
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in which case one wonders why the Validation Phase was not called Accreditation in the first
place.  The intent of the Phases would be more evident if the names were Certification during
Development, Certification at Acceptance, and Certification during Production, for example, as
suggested in Table 5 below.
2.2 5200.40
This section presents (1) the process, (2) the systems classification, and (3) the standard of
measurement provided by 5200.40.
2.2.1  Process for 5200.40
One of the recurring themes of 5200.40 is the word “agreement.”  The goal of almost all the
Phases, Activities, and Tasks is to come to agreement, either about a definition or about
certification.  A second recurring theme is the word “tailor.”  DITSCAP can be adjusted to suit
many needs.  However, all activities in these phases are “mandatory” (5200.40, 6.4, page 5 (see
also 8510.1-M, C2.1.2, page 29)), and none of the requirements agreed upon in Phase 1 can be
tailored.
DITSCAP is intended to be “adaptable to any type of IT system and any computing
environment and mission” (5200.40, 6.4, page 5) and apparently any program development
strategy.  5200.40 describes four such strategies:
• evolutionary: design and implementation alternate in time, and subsequent designs are not
defined at system inception  (5200.40, E2.1.23, page 10);
• grand design: all of the design precedes all of the implementation (5200.40, E2.1.25, page
10);
• incremental: design and implementation alternate in time, but subsequent design is already
defined at system inception  (5200.40, E2.1.26, page 10);
• other: “variations and/or combinations” of the previous three strategies (5200.40, E2.1.41,
page 12)  (see also 8510.1-M, Chapter 7, pages 131-2).
2.2.2 Systems Classification for 5200.40
5200.40 includes a description of the “ITSEC [Information Technology Security] system classes.”
In this classification scheme, systems are grouped based on seven characteristics:
1. Interfacing Mode
Table 5 DITSCAP Given and Suggested Phase Names
Phase Given Phase Name Suggested Phase Name
1 Definition Agreement
2 Verification Certification during Development
3 Validation Certification at Acceptance
4 Post Accreditation Certification during Production18
2. Processing Mode
3. Attribution Mode
4. Mission-Reliance Factor
5. Accessibility Factor
6. Accuracy Factor
7. Information Categories (5200.40, Table E7-1, page 58)
For each characteristic a system is required to be assigned exactly one of a set of three or four
mutually-exclusive values.7  For example, for the Interfacing Mode characteristic, a system is
either Benign, or Passive, or Active.  This arrangement describes 9,216 classes.8
Mention is made in 5200.40 of “four certification levels” (5200.40, E3.3.3.6, page 22) that would
provide “minimum-security requirements” (5200.40, E3.3.3.2, page 21).  There does not appear
to be even a set of names for the four certification levels in 5200.40.  However, a name set does
appear in 8510.1-M, as follows:
Level 1 - basic security review,
Level 2 - minimum analysis,
Level 3 - detailed analysis, or
Level 4 - comprehensive analysis. (8510.1-M, C2.1.3, page 30)
It is intended that each of the system classes should map to the four certification levels.  Such a
mapping does not appear to be presented in 5200.40.  However, a mapping does appear in
8510.1-M, as shown in Section 2.3.2 below.
2.2.3  Measurement Standard for 5200.40
No measurement standard is described in 5200.40.  However, a standard is described in 8510.1-
M (see Section 2.3.3 below).
7.  This count assumes no distinction between the five possible types of Sensitive information within the “Information Categories”
characteristic.
8.  3 * 4 * 4 * 4 * 4 * 3 * 4 = 32 * 45 = 9 * (22)5 = 9 * 210 = 9 * 1,024 = 9,216.
Unfortunately 8510.1-M describes a different number of system classes.
Both 5200.40 and 8510.1-M use the same number of characteristics (seven) and, for the first six characteristics, both documents use
same number of alternatives.  However, for the last characteristic, Information Categories, 5200.40 uses four alternatives (Unclassi-
fied, Sensitive, Collateral Classified, or Compartmented/Special Access Classified (5200.40, Table E7-1, page 58)) but 8510.1-M uses
six alternatives (Unclassified, Sensitive, Confidential, Secret, Top Secret, Compartmented/Special Access Classified) (8510.1-M, Table
C3.T9, page 53)).  As a result, 8510.1-M describes 3/2 as many classes as 5200.40, namely 3 * 4 * 4 * 4 * 4 * 3 * 6 = 33 * 29 = 27 * 512 =
13,824.
Within the Sensitive alternative, both 5200.40 and 8510.1-M use what we could call sub-alternatives. If we account for these, the two
documents still describe different numbers of system classes.  Within the Sensitive alternative 5200.40 uses five sub-alternatives (Pri-
vacy Act, Financially Sensitive, Administrative, Proprietary, or Other (5200.40, Table E7-1, page 58)), but 8510.1-M uses only four (Pri-
vacy Act, Financially Sensitive, Proprietary, Administrative/Other (8510.1-M, C3.4.8.2.1.1.7.2.1-4, pages 57-8)). If we factor these sub-
alternatives into the number of classes, then 5200.40 describes 3 * 4 * 4 * 4 * 4 * 3 * 8 = 32 * 211 = 9 * 2,048 = 18,432 classes and 8500.1-M
describes 3 * 4 * 4 * 4 * 4 * 3 * 9 = 34 * 28 = 81 * 256 = 20,736 classes.
So, between the two documents, there are at least 9,216 system classes and not more than 20,736.19
2.3  8510.1-M
8510.1-M is a clarification and expansion of 5200.40’s description of DITSCAP.  What 5200.40
describes in 26 pages in Enclosure 3, 8510.1-M describes in 104 pages in Chapters 3-7.9  As I
understand it, 8510.1-M takes precedence over 5200.40 in typical usage.
2.3.1  Process for 8510.1-M
For each Task within each Activity within each Phase, 8510.1-M provides the following five
items: the objective, the description, the prerequisite tasks, the input, and the output.  For each
Phase the document lists the roles and responsibilities for the DAA, the CA, the user
representative and the program manager.  The names of the Phases, Activities, and Tasks are
shown in Appendix A beginning on page 45 herein.
2.3.2  Systems Classification for 8510.1-M
8510.1-M provides names and minimal descriptions of the four levels of certification noted in
5200.40 (8510.1-M, Table C3.T8, page 53).  Level 1 is established by the “completion of the
minimum security checklist.”  Level 2 is differentiated from Level 1 by an “independent
certification analysis,” and Level 3 is differentiated from Level 2 by a “more in-depth,
independent analysis,” and Level 4 is differentiated from Level 3 by “the most extensive
independent analysis” (ibid.).
8510.1-M also maps the system classes (see Section 2.2.2 above) defined by ITSEC to the four
levels of certification.  Each of the values for the seven characteristics is given a numeric value
(8510.1-M, Table C3.T9, page 53).  The sum of the values for all the characteristics falls in the
range of 3-48 inclusive.  Most of the sums map to one Level, but 20 of the sums map to two
Levels (8510.1-M, Table C3.T10, page 59).  It is not clear how to determine which Level is to be
used in the case of those 20 overlapping values, though 8510.-1M does say that it should be
done “as agreed to by the DAA, the Certifier [i.e., the CA], the program manager, or10 user
representative” (8510.1-M, C3.4.8.2.1.3, page 59), thereby following the agreement-philosophy of
DITSCAP.
2.3.3  Measurement Standard for 8510.1-M
8510.1-M provides a set of Checklists, each set presented in a separate Table in Appendix 2
(8510.1-M, pages 146-57), for Phases 2 and 3 for Level 1 security.  For Phase 2, there are six
Checklists.  There is no Checklist for Task 2-6 “Security Requirement Validation Procedures”
(8510.1-M, C4.3.7, page 82) even though the “Input” for the Task 2-6, as shown on page 83 of
8510.1-M, calls for a Checklist.  For Phase 3, there are Checklists for all eight of the Tasks.
The coverage of the Checklist Tables in Appendix 2 is shown below in Table 6.
9.  I am not counting the Checklists in Appendix 2 of 8510.1-M in this page count.
10.  Not “and”?20
Each item in a Checklist consists of a question that is to be answered with one of three choices:
Yes, No, or N/A. The following are the first two items in the Checklist for the first relevant Task
in the certification activity for Phase 2:
1. Does the systems architecture documentation describe the architecture,
including graphics, of the system and interconnections providing or
supporting, system functions?
2. For a domain, does the systems architecture show how multiple systems
link and interoperate and describe the internal construction and
operations of particular systems within the architecture? (8510.1-M, Table
AP2.T1, page 146)
There are 105 items in the six Checklists for Phase 2, and 92 items in the eight Checklists for
Phase 3.
For each of the Tasks, there is a Task Description that describes how to perform the Task at each
Level.  The instructions for Level i+1, 1 ≤ i < 4, are a superset—usually proper—of the
instructions for Level i. For example, the instruction for Level 1 for Task 2-1, the first Task in the
certification Activity in Phase 2, is simply
Complete the Minimal Security Activity Checklist [for this particular
Task].11 (8510.1-M, C4.3.2.2.1, page 68)
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a. The following explanation of part of this first line of the table should be sufficient to explain the
rest of the table: Task 2-1 is described on page 68 of 8510.1-M and the Checklist for this Task is
shown in Table AP2.T1 in Appendix 2.21
For Level 2 the instruction is
C4.3.2.2.2. Level 2. Complete the Minimal Security Activity Checklist.
Analyze the system level information to evaluate the security architecture
compliance with the approach stated in the SSAA.  The system
architecture must be evaluated for compliance with the security
requirements.  The interfaces between this and other systems must be
identified and their ability to preserve the security integrity must be
evaluated.  The system architecture must be evaluated for consistency
with other governing architectures (Department of Defense Intelligence
Information System (DoDIIS) Reference Model. etc.). (8510.1-M, pages 68-
9)
Presumably the instruction above is to be used to generate Checklists specifically for Level 2.
However, no help is given on how we are to create those Checklists to guide our evaluation of
an interface’s “ability to preserve the security integrity,” for example.
The Level 3 instruction, in this continuing example, changes one sentence in the Level 2
instruction and adds two, new sentences.  Instead of the Level 2 sentence
Analyze the system level information to evaluate the security architecture
compliance with the approach stated in the SSAA.
the Level 3 sentence is
Conduct a detailed analysis of the system level information to evaluate
the security architecture compliance with the stated approach in the
SSAA. (8510.1-M, C4.3.2.2.3, page 69, emphasis in the original)
The two new sentences are
Security test plans and procedures must be developed.  Each security
requirement identified in the SSAA must be validated through testing.
(8510.1-M, C4.3.2.2.3, page 69, emphasis in the original)
The Level 4 instruction changes the same sentence that the Level 3 instruction changed, and
Level 4 adds one new sentence.  The changed sentence now reads
Conduct a comprehensive analysis of the system level information to
evaluate the security architecture compliance with the stated approach in
the SSAA. (8510.1-M, C4.3.2.2.4, page 69, emphasis in the original)
The new sentence is
The system analysis must include fault tree analysis, flaw hypothesis,
or similar type of analysis. (8510.1-M, C4.3.2.2.4, page 69, emphasis in the
original)
At the end of the material for each Task is a list of suggested references for that particular Task.
11.  The Checklist for this Task is in Table AP2.T1 on page 146.22
The following is an example of a reference:
C4.3.2.6.1.  “Systems Engineering Management Guide” (Defense Systems
Management College, January 1990 (reference n)) (8510.1-M, page 69)23
This page intentionally almost blank.24
3  8500.1 & 8500.2
This section reviews 8500.1 first, followed by 8500.2.
3.1  8500.1
This section presents (1) the process, (2) the systems classification, and (3) the standard of
measurement provided by 8500.1.
3.1.1  Process for 8500.1
8500.1 states that 5200.40 provides the direction for certification and accreditation:
4.13. All DoD information systems shall be certified and accredited in
accordance with DoD Instruction 5200.40 (reference (u)). (8500.1, page 6)
In addition, NSTISS Policy Number 11 [22] provides the direction for evaluation and validation
of components and products:
All IA or IA-enabled IT hardware, firmware, and software components or
products incorporated into DoD information systems must comply with
the evaluation and validation requirements of National Security
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policy Number 11
(reference (w)). (8500.1, 4.17, page 7)
3.1.2 Systems Classification for 8500.1
8500.1 defines a nine-element systems classification which is the Cartesian product of three
Mission Assurance Categories and three Confidentiality Levels.    This systems classification is
related to Information Assurance (IA) as follows.   8500.1 defines Information Assurance (IA) as
a collection consisting of confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and non-
repudiation (8500.1, E2.1.17, page 20).  8500.1 continues, “Requirements for availability and
integrity are associated with the information mission assurance category, while requirements for
confidentiality are associated with the information classification or sensitivity and need-to-
know” (i.e., Confidentiality Level)  (8500.1, 4.7, page 4).
3.1.3  Measurement Standard for 8500.1
8500.1 notes that “Both sets of requirements [(1) for availability & integrity and (2) for
confidentiality] are primarily expressed in the form of IA Controls” (8500.1, 4.7, page 4), which
are not presented in 8500.1 but are shown in the Attachments to Enclosure 4 of 8500.2 (see
Section 3.2.3 below).  Authentication and non-repudiation seem to be minor concerns but are
also taken care of: “The IA solutions that provide availability, integrity, and confidentiality also
provide authentication and non-repudiation” (8500.1, 4.7, page 4).25
3.2  8500.2
8500.2 implements 8500.1: “This Instruction implements the policies established in DoD
Directive 8500.1 (reference (a))” (8500.2, 4, page 2).
The Global Information Grid, to which DoD systems are moving, is “inherently vulnerable to
exploitation and denial of service” (8500.2, E3.1.1, page 30).  “Complete confidence…cannot be
achieved” (8500.2, E3.1.2, page 30).  Thus, because we cannot eliminate risk, the best we can
hope for is to manage it.  This requires that we be able to assess needs, design purposefully,
implement controls, test & verify, and manage change.  Enclosure 4 of 8500.2 “establishes a
baseline set of IA Controls to be applied to all DoD Information Systems” (8500.2, E3.2.2, page
31). The Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF) [12] “is a common reference guide
for selecting and applying adequate and appropriate IA and IA-enabled technology” (8500.2,
E3.2.4, page 32).
This section presents (1) the process, (2) the systems classification, and (3) the standard of
measurement provided by 8500.2.
3.2.1  Process for 8500.2
8500.2 states that “all elements of a DoD information system IA program shall be developed,
implemented, and maintained through the DoD IA C&A process” (8500.2, E3.4.9, page 47). The
process is DITSCAP.
3.2.2  Systems Classification for 8500.2
DoD information systems that require C&A are confined to the following four types12:
1. Automated Information System (AIS) Application,
2. Enclave,
3. Outsourced IT-Based Process, and
4. Platform IT Interconnection (8500.2, E2.1.17, pages 17-8).
C&A is not required for systems that are not one of the above four system types.
In order to determine the applicable set of IA controls, a different classification system is used,
consisting of nine-elements and described in the next three paragraphs.
8500.2 defines three Mission Assurance Categories (MAC), based on (1) the importance of the
data to the mission and (2) the impact of a loss of availability and/or integrity to the mission.
•In MAC I systems, the data is “vital” to the mission; the loss of either availability or integrity
is “unacceptable.”
12.  These types are also defined in 8500.1.26
•In MAC II systems, the data is “important” to the mission; the loss of integrity is still “unac-
ceptable” but the loss of availability can be “tolerated” though only “for a short time.”
•In MAC III systems, the data is “necessary” to the mission, and the loss of either availability
or integrity “can be tolerated or overcome without significant impact on mission effective-
ness or potential readiness” (8500.2, E2.1.38, pages 22-3).
8500.2 also defines three Confidentiality Levels, named Classified, Sensitive, and Public (8500.2,
E2.1.8, page 16).
The Cartesian product of the three MAC levels and the three Confidentiality Levels produces a
nine-element systems classification scheme, shown in Table 9 below.
3.2.3  Measurement Standard for 8500.2
The measurement standard presented in 8500.2 is a set of IA Controls.  An IA Control is defined
formally as follows:
E2.1.26. IA Control.  An objective IA condition of integrity, availability or
confidentiality achieved through the application of specific safeguards or
through the regulation of specific activities that is expressed in a specified
format (i.e., a control number, a control name, control text and a control
class). Specific management, personnel, operational, and technical
controls are applied to each DoD information system to achieve an
appropriate level of integrity, availability, and confidentiality in
accordance with OMB Circular A-130 (reference (v)). (8500.2, page 20)13
An IA Control is defined informally as follows:
E4.1.2. An IA Control describes an objective IA condition achieved
through the application of specific safeguards or through the regulation of
specific activities.  The objective condition is testable, compliance is
measurable, and the activities required to achieve the IA Control are
assignable and thus accountable. (8500.2, page 48)
There are four parts to each IA Control:
1. a Subject Area (this appears to correspond to the “control class” of E2.1.26 (see above)),
2. a Control Number,
3. a Control Name, and
4. a Control Text,
13. This definition is the same as that used in 8500.1 (E2.1.19, page 20). Interim-DIACAP replaces the final phrase “OMB Circular A-
130” with “DoDI 8500.2” ([9], E2.1.36, page 18).  The reference to OMB A-130 appears to be an editing oversight: OMB A-130 is not
imposed on the DoD.  (Neither 5200.40 nor 8510.1-M provide a definition of IA Control.)27
as described in Table 7 below.
The IA Controls are partitioned based on the eight Subject Areas that appear in Table 8 below
(the Names of the IA Control Subject Areas in Table 8 appear in the same order as they do in the
Table 7 IA Control Partsa
a. This table is adapted from Figure E4.F1 (8500.2, page 48).
Part Description Example
IA Control Subject Area (The Subject Areas are listed inTable 8 below.)
“Enclave and Computing Envi-
ronment”
IA Control Number
(e.g., “ECCT-1”)
The two-letter abbreviation of the
Subject Area, followed by… EC
the two-letter abbreviation of the
Control Name (see below in this
table), followed by…
CT
a dash, followed by… -
the integer that is the “Control Level”
(i.e., the robustness level of the con-
trolb).
b. “Robustness” refers to the “strength of a mechanism.” There are three levels of robustness—
High, Medium, and Basic—denoted with the integers 3, 2, 1, respectively.   The integer indicates
the “Control Level.”  Basic robustness corresponds to “good commercial practice” (8500.2,
E3.2.4.3.4, page 33).
If there is an IA Control with Control Level 3, then there exists two additional IA Controls with
similar Control Numbers but with Control Level 2 and Control Level 1.
If there is an IA Control with Control Level 2, then there exists one additional IA Control with a
similar Control Number but with Control Level 1, and there may exist a second additional IA Con-
trol with a similar Control Number but with Control Level 3.
If there is an IA Control with Control Level 1, then there may exist an additional IA Control with a
similar Control Number but with Control Level 2, and if that IA Control exists, then there may
exist a second additional IA Control with a similar Control Number but with Control Level 3
(8500.2, E4.1.3.4, page 49).
1
IA Control Name This is name of the control. “Encryption for Confidentiality(Data in Transit)”
IA Control Text This describes the IA Control.
“Unclassified, sensitive data
transmitted through a commer-
cial or wireless network are
encrypted using NIST-certified
cryptography (See also DCSR-
2).”  (8500.2, page 95)28
Attachments to 8500.2).
The IA Controls are not spread evenly across the Subject Areas.  For example, the four most-
populous Subject Areas comprise 83% of the total number of IA Controls.
As an example of an IA Control—in addition to the one shown in Table 7—the following is the
first IA Control for the first Attachment, A1:
DCAR-1 Procedural Review
An annual IA review is conducted that comprehensively evaluates
existing policies and processes to ensure procedural consistency and to
ensure that they fully support the goals of uninterrupted operations.
(8500.2, page 54)
The IA Control Subject Area for the example IA Control above is Security Design &
Configuration, which we can determine by the appearance of the Subject Area’s abbreviation,
“DC” (see Table 8), in the IA Control Number, which is “DCAR-1.”  The Control Level is 1.  The
IA Control Name is Procedural Review.  The IA Control Text is “An annual…uninterrupted
operations,” as shown above.
The following is the second IA Control in the first Attachment, A1:
DCBP-1 Best Security Practices
The DoD information system security design incorporates best security
practices such as single sign-on, PKE, smart card, and biometrics. (8500.2,
page 54)
Attachments A1, A2, and A3 provide the integrity and availability requirements for Mission
Assurance Categories I, II, and III respectively; Attachments A4, A5, and A6 provide the
confidentiality requirements for the three Confidentiality Levels, Classified, Sensitive, and
Table 8 IA Control Subject Areasa
a. This is a slight superset of Table E4.T1 on page 49 of 8500.2—I added the total.  (I also reor-
dered the columns.)
Name Abbreviation
Number of IA Controls
in the Subject Area
Security Design & Configuration DC 31
Identification and Authentication IA 9
Enclave and Computing Environment EC 48
Enclave Boundary Defense EB 8
Physical and Environmental PE 27
Personnel PR 7
Continuity CO 24
Vulnerability and Incident Management VI 3
TOTAL = 15729
Public, respectively.  The assignment of Attachments enables us to populate the nine-element
systems classification, described in Section 3.2.2 above, with IA Controls, as shown in Table 9
below.
Given a MAC level and a Confidentiality Level we can use Table 9 to determine the two
Attachments that specify the IA Controls we should use.  Each element in Table 9 is referred to
as a “baseline IA level” (8500.2, E4.1.1, page 48).  The word “baseline” in this context appears to
be shorthand for “these controls apply, in addition to whatever other security requirements
apply.”
There are 293 IA Controls listed in the six Attachments, as shown in Table 10, but only 157 are
unique: some of the IA Controls are included in more than one of the six Attachments.
8500.2 notes that the IA Controls “must be explicitly addressed as part of an information system
Table 9 8500.2 Systems Classification
MAC
Confidentiality Level
Classified Sensitive Public
I A1 & A4 A1 & A5 A1 & A6
II A2 & A4 A2 & A5 A2a & A6
a. Table E4.T2 on page 50 in 8500.2, from which this table was derived, shows
A3 in this cell, not A2 as shown here. A2 fits the pattern, not A3, and there is
no note adjacent to Table E4.T2 explaining this deviation, so I assume that the
correct entry is A2, not A3.
III A3 & A4 A3 & A5 A3 & A6
Table 10 Number of IA Controlsa
a. The material in this table is gleaned from Attachments 1-6, pages 54-102, of Enclosure 4 in
8500.2.
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Confidenti-
ality
Integrity Availability
A1 Mission
Assurance
Category
I 32 38 70
A2 II 32 38 70
A3 III 27 37 64
A4
Confidential-
ity Level
Classified 45 45
A5 Sensitive 34 34
A5 Public 10 10
Column Totals → 89 91 113
Grand
Total =
29330
security engineering process” (8500.2, E3.4.2, page 41).  The IA Controls “shall constitute the
baseline requirements for IA certification and accreditation or reaccreditation” (8500.2, E4.1.9,
page 53).
The IA Controls are different than the security functional requirements of the Common Criteria,
for example.  IA Controls are concerned with the “definition, configuration, operation,
interconnection, and disposal of DoD information systems” (8500.2, E3.4.3, page 42); the
Common Criteria, on the other hand, constitutes “an engineering language and method for
specifying the security features of individual IT products” (ibid.).31
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4  Interim-DIACAP
This section first presents (1) the process, (2) the systems classification, and (3) the standard of
measurement provided by Interim-DIACAP. This section then summarizes DIACAP, followed
by a comparison of DIACAP with DITSCAP.
4.1  Process for Interim-DIACAP
DIACAP, as described by Interim-DIACAP [9], provides a process in the form of a series of
“activities,” each of which consists of one or more “tasks,” and all of which may run
“concurrently or at different frequencies” ([9], E3.5, page 31), as shown in Table 11.  (The
DIACAP process is compared with the DITSCAP process in Section 4.5.2 on page 38.)
4.2  Systems Classification for Interim-DIACAP
Interim-DIACAP does not present a systems classification but simply refers to the one
presented in 8500.2 (see Section 3.2.2 on page 26).
4.3  Measurement Standard for Interim-DIACAP
As with the systems classification, Interim-DIACAP does not present a measurement standard
Table 11 DIACAP Activitiesa
a. This table uses the text of Figure E3.2 ([9], page 31).
Activity Taskb
b. For ease of reference, the tasks are given numbers in this Table (e.g., “1.1”, “1.2”). The tasks are
not numbered in Interim-DIACAP.
1. Initiate and Plan C&A
1.1 Register system with DoD Component IA
Program
1.2 Assign IA Controls
1.3 Assemble DIACAP Team
1.4 Initiate DIACAP Implementation Plan
2. Implement and Validate Assigned IA Con-
trols
2.1 Execute DIACAP Implementation Plan
2.2 Conduct Validation Activities
2.3 Compile Validation results in DIACAP Score-
card
3. Make Certification Determination & Accredita-
tion Decision
3.1 Make Certification Decision
3.2 Issue Accreditation Decision
4. Maintain Authority to Operate and Conduct
Reviews
4.1 Maintain Situational Awareness (Review of
IA Controls must occur at least annually)
4.2 Maintain IA Posture
5. Decommission 5.1 Retire system33
but simply refers to the one presented in 8500.2 (see Section 3.2.3 on page 27).
4.4  DIACAP
DIACAP is a compliance-based approach.  DIACAP rests on two principles14:
1. IA is established via IA Controls.
2. IA Controls need to be maintained.
The meaning of C&A is defined in terms of IA Controls:
E2.1.25. DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation
Process (DIACAP).  The Dod processes for identifying, implementing,
validating, certifying, and managing IA capabilities and services, expressed
as IA controls15, and authorizing the operation of DoD information
systems16  in accordance with statutory, Federal and DoD requirements.
([9], page 15, emphasis added)
More succinctly, IA Controls are the “basis” for C&A ([9], E3.3.3, page 28).
The IA Controls for a given system are referred to as Assigned IA Controls and that set is
defined as follows:
E2.1.5. Assigned IA Controls.  A list of all IA Controls that a DoD
information system must address to achieve an adequate IA posture.
Assigned IA Controls include all baseline DoD IA Controls, optional DoD
IA Controls for special conditions or technologies, e.g., health information
portability and privacy or cross security domain solutions, and DoD
Mission Area Component and DoD information system supplements, if
any. ([9], page 13)
The set of Assigned IA Controls thus consists of two subsets:
1. a set of “baseline” IA Controls, the membership for which is determined by 8500.2 (see
Table 9 on page 30 herein), and
2. a set of additional IA Controls that may be peculiar to a given system.
Risk Management is to be achieved “through the implementation of assigned IA Controls” ([9],
14.  neither of which is made explicit, unfortunately, in Interim-DIACAP.
15. This expression, “expressed as IA Controls,” appears in exactly two other places in Interim-DIACAP: Paragraph 4.1 ([9], page 2),
and Paragraph E3.1 ([9], page 27).
16.  “E.2.1.46. Information System (IS).  Set of information resources organized for the collection, storage, processing, maintenance
use, sharing, dissemination, disposition, display, or transmission of information” ([9], page 19).
“E2.1.45. Information Resources.  Information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and information technol-
ogy” ([9], page 19).
Checkland & Holwell [4] distinguish information technology (IT) from information systems (IS).  An information system consists of
people organized to take “purposeful action” as well as IT in the form of supporting technology, such as the radar and telephones
used to support the British during the Battle of Britain (see [4], Chapter 5).  IA of IT becomes particularly meaningful when it is con-
sidered in support of a particular IS.  Perhaps a future step in the evolution of IA in the DoD will consider this dichotomy.34
E2.1.61, page 21).
Each IA Control is given an “Impact Code” of High, Moderate, or Low, that indicates the impact
“associated with non-compliance or exploitation” ([9], E2.1.42, page 19) of the IA Control.  The
Impact Code can also indicate “urgency with which corrective action should be taken” (ibid.).
To bring home the importance of IA Controls in Interim-DIACAP, consider that “IA posture”17
is defined relative to compliance with IA controls (i.e., certification) ([9], E4.3, page 39; see also
“Notional DIACAP Scorecard,” E4.A2, page 43) and that residual risk is defined as follows
E2.1.60. Residual Risk.  Risk due to partial or unsatisfactory
implementation of assigned IA Controls. ([9], page 21)
implying that if the assigned IA Controls are correctly determined and those Controls are
completely and satisfactorily implemented, then there will be no residual risk.
DIACAP requires periodically (1) checking the safeguards and regulations associated with a
system’s assigned IA Controls (“at least annually” ([9], 4.8, page 3) and (2) the subsequent
development and execution of plans that will rectify the safeguards and/or regulations found
lagging during the periodic check.  In this way, DIACAP maintains IA.
The DIACAP Knowledge Service (KS) “provides the DoDI 8500.2 IA Controls as well as the
required, standardized DoD IA Controls implementation procedures, validation procedures and
expected results for each IA Control” ([9], 6, page 10).  KS is “DoD’s official resource for
implementing and executing the DIACAP” ([9], E5.1, page 54).
4.4.1  Documentation
DIACAP documentation is a Package with five parts:
1. System Identification Profile (SIP),
2. Implementation Plan
3. Supporting Documentation for Certification
4. DIACAP Scorecard, and
5. POA&M18 (if required). ([9], Table E4.1, page 38)
A Package is to be “maintained throughout a system’s life cycle” ([9], E4.1, page 38).  This
should happen as a natural consequence of the required, periodic re-validation of IA Controls
and the inevitable resulting POA&M and related Implementation Plan (see below).
The SIP consists of up to 34 parts, all but one of which could be called fields because they
require no creativity to complete.  The one field that does require some creativity is item 7,
17.  “An unacceptable IA posture results when the IA Controls compliance posture does not match that authorized by the Accredita-
tion Decision” ([9], E4.A3.6, page 47).  (An Accreditation Decision is one of four possibilities: Authorization to Operate (ATO),
Interim Authorization to Operate (IATT), Interim Authorization to Test (IATT), and Denial of Authorization to Operate (DATO) ([9],
E2.1.2, page 13).)
18.  POA&M = Plan of Action and Milestones.35
“System Description,” which is “A narrative description of the system, its function, and uses”
([9], page 40).19
The Implementation Plan consists of (a) the list of assigned IA Controls and (b) their
implementation status, (c) identification of responsible entities (e.g., who is the DAA for this
system?), (d) the resources available for this Plan, and (e) the estimated completion date for each
IA Control.
The Supporting Documentation for Certification consists of (a) validation results, (b)
implementation “artifacts,”20 and (c) “other,” which I presume is a catch-all.
The DIACAP Scorecard shows the system’s IA posture which includes the accreditation status
(i.e., ATO, IATO, IATT, or DATO) and a list, if needed, of recent IA Controls with which the
system has been non-compliant and a POA&M for the current non-compliant IA Controls ([9],
page 43).
The POA&M (i.e., Plan of Action and Milestones) is a “management tool” that describes the
“corrective actions” that will bring (or return) a system to, I presume, the ATO state.  In other
words, the POA&M is an action plan based on audit findings.  The CA assigns to each IA
Control, about which correction action needs to be taken, a Severity Code of CAT I, CAT II, or
CAT III, that specifies the risk level and/or urgency with which the corrective action is to be
addressed, where CAT I indicates greatest risk and CAT III least risk.
The DIACAP Package in its entirety can be referred to as the Comprehensive Package to
distinguish it from the Executive Package which includes neither the Implementation Plan nor
the Supporting Documentation for Certification.
4.4.2  Roles
DIACAP defines nine roles, shown in Table 12.
A single person may adopt multiple roles simultaneously as specified by a set of constraints
provided by Interim-DIACAP.  These constraints are explored in Appendix C.1 beginning on
page 57 herein.
Interim-DIACAP also provides constraints on who may report to whom.  These reporting
constraints are explored in Appendix C.2 beginning on page 60 herein.
19. The SIP includes a “Mission Criticality” item (#13) with three categories: Mission Critical (MC), Mission Essential (ME), and Mis-
sion Support (MS) ([9], page 40).  Not only are these categories not defined, they are not used anywhere else in the document.  I am
told that these terms appeared in older documents.  Based on their usage, these terms appear to correspond to MAC I, MAC II, and
MAC III, respectively.  One would think that Mission Criticality would be input to the system categorization, along with the three
Mission Assurance Categories and the three Confidentiality Levels, to form a 3 x 3 x 3 matrix to determine the set of baseline IA con-
trols.  Perhaps this will occur in the future.
20.  “E2.1.4. Artifacts.  System policies, documentation, plans, test results and the like that express or enforce the IA posture of the
DoD information system, make up the C&A information, and provide evidence of compliance with the assigned AI Controls” ([9],
page 13).36
4.5  DIACAP vis-à-vis DITSCAP
This section describes the differences between DIACAP and DITSCAP, reflected in the
differences in documentation, process, definitions (of accreditation, certification, validation, and
verification), and roles.
Table 12 DIACAP Roles
Role
Description
Name Abbreviation
Program or System Manager PM or SM
The names for this role are as though PM and
SM were synonymous, e.g., “Program Manager
(a.k.a. System Manager)” (or “System Manager
(a.k.a. Program Manager)”).  (I think the con-
cept would be clearer if it were written “PM/
SM” (or “SM/PM”).)
Designated Accrediting
Authority DAA
“This term is synonymous with Designated
Approving Authority and Delegated Accredit-
ing Authority” ([9], E2.1.19, page 15).
Certifying Authority CA
“The senior official having the authority and
responsibility for the certification of informa-
tion systems governed by a DoD Component
IA Program” ([9], E2.1.11, page 14).
User Representative UR
“Individual or organization that represents the
user community in the DIACAP” ([9], E2.1.69,
page 22).
Chief Information Officer CIO
(There is no entry in the set of definitions for
CIO, though there is an entry in the set of acro-
nyms.)
Principal Accrediting
Authority PAA
“The senior official having the authority and
responsibility for information systems within a
GIG [Global Information Grid] Mission Area”
([9], E2.1.57, page 21).
Senior Information
Assurance Officer SIAO
“Official responsible for directing an organiza-
tion’s information assurance program on behalf
of the organization’s CIO” ([9], E.2.1.63, page
21).
Information Assurance
Manager IAM
IAM “…may be used interchangeably with the
title Information System Security Manager
(ISSM)” ([9], E2.1.38, page 18).
Information Assurance
Officer IAO
“The individual responsible to the IAM for
ensuring that the appropriate operational IA
posture is maintained for a DoD information
system or organization.” ([9], E2.1.29, page 18)37
4.5.1  Documentation
Whereas DITSCAP focuses on agreement between the four roles, DIACAP focuses on IA
Controls.  This difference is reflected in the differences between the SSAA and the DIACAP
Package.  Generally speaking DITSCAP’s SSAA is a description and does not reflect a plan,21
whereas DIACAP’s Package is a plan and only briefly a description.  The SSAA has no obvious
section that describes the system’s protections.  The Implementation Plan of the Package, on the
other hand, focuses on those protections.  The SSAA has no obvious section, excepting
Appendix H “CA’s Recommendations,” on how weaknesses are to be addressed.  The POA&M
part of the Package, on the other hand, has no other purpose.
4.5.2  Process
The DIACAP activities are essentially the same as the DITSCAP Phases, with the exception that
the last DIACAP activity, Decommission, is new with DIACAP, as shown in Table 13.
However, what is different is the nature of the activities.  DITSCAP requires that Phase n be
completed before Phase n+1 begins22.  DIACAP, on the other hand, allows activities23 to be
running in parallel and at different frequencies.
4.5.3  Definitions
DITSCAP and DIACAP define several key terms differently.  Concerning “accreditation,”
DIACAP discards DITSCAP’s use of “acceptable level” of risk, and DIACAP specifies
accreditation to be one of four possibilities.  Concerning “certification,” DIACAP makes the
purpose clearer, namely  “to establish compliance with IA controls.”  Concerning “validation,”
DITSCAP focuses on agreement and DIACAP focuses on test results.  DITSCAP validation
applies only to “completed” systems.  Concerning “verification,” DIACAP has no need of a
21.  Yes, Section 7 of the SSAA is entitled “DITSCAP Plan,” but the only subsection of that Section that calls for action is 7.2 “Tasks
and milestones.”  This is qualitatively different than DIACAP’s “Implementation Plan” and POA&M.  (Three of the SSAA Appendi-
ces, namely J, K, and M, have “plan” in their title, but none of these are concerned with how the system’s protections are to be evalu-
ated or brought up to adequacy.)
Table 13 DITSCAP Phases & DIACAP Activities Compared
DITSCAP Phase DIACAP Activity
Phase 1, Definition 1. Initiate and Plan C&A
Phase 2, Verification 2. Implement and Validate Assigned IA Controls
Phase 3, Validation 3. Make Certification Determination & Accredita-tion Decision
Phase 4, Post Accreditation 4. Maintain Authority to Operate and ConductReviews
(No corresponding Phase) 5. Decommission
22.  Figure E3-1 (5200.40, page 17) is a flowchart for all the activities in all of the DITSCAP Phases.  All paths through the flowchart
describe a sequential execution of nodes; no path initiates parallel execution.
23.  except, of course, Decommission.38
definition because DIACAP’s “validation” applies to a system at any point in the life-cycle. The
DITSCAP and DIACAP definitions are shown in Table 14.
Table 14 DITSCAP/DIACAP Definitions  (Sheet 1 of 2)
Term DITSCAP DIACAP
A
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d
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E2.1.2. Accreditation. Formal declaration by
the DAA that an IT system is approved to
operate in a particular security mode using a
prescribed set of safeguards at an acceptable
level of risk. (5200.40, page 8)
E.2.1.2. Accreditation Decision.  An official
designation from a DAA, in writing or digi-
tally signed and made visible to the DoD
CIO, regarding acceptance of the risk associ-
ated with operating a DoD information sys-
tem and expressed as an Authorization to
Operate (ATO), an Interim Authorization to
Operate (IATO), and Interim Authorization
to Test (ATT), or a Denial of Authorization to
Operate  (DATO). ([9], page 13)
1. DIACAP discards DITSCAP’s use of “acceptable level” of risk.
2. DIACAP specifies the decision to be one of four possibilities.
C
er
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
E2.1.8. Certification. Comprehensive evalua-
tion of the technical and non-technical secu-
rity features of an IT system and other
safeguards, made in support of the accredita-
tion process, to establish the extent that a par-
ticular design and implementation meets a
set of specific security requirements. (5200.40,
page 8)
E2.1.9. Certification.  A comprehensive vali-
dation of actual IA capabilities and services
of a DoD information system, made as part of
and in support of the DIACAP, to establish
compliance with assigned IA controls based
on standardized procedures. ([9], page 13)
DIACAP makes the purpose  clearer, namely  “to establish compliance with assigned IA con-
trols.”
V
al
id
at
io
n
E2.1.64. Validation. Determination of the cor-
rect implementation in the completed IT sys-
tem with the security requirements and
approach agreed on by the users, acquisition
authority, and the DAA. (5200.40, page 14,
emphasis added)
E2.1.70. Validation Procedure.  Activity
applied throughout the system life cycle, to
confirm or establish by testing, evaluation,
examination, investigation, or competent evi-
dence that a DoD information system’s
assigned IA Controls are implemented cor-
rectly and are effective in their application.
([9], page 22)
1. DITSCAP focuses on agreement; DIACAP focuses on the results of interaction with the sys-
tem throughout the life cycle.
2. DITSCAP’s validation applies  only to “completed” systems; DIACAP’s validation makes
no similar, explicit constraint.39
4.5.4  Roles
DITSCAP uses four roles: PM, DAA, CA, UR. The DITSCAP documents define two additional
roles:
•an Information System Security Officer (ISSO) (5200.40, E2.1.31, page 11; 8510.1-M,
DL1.1.42, page 13) and
•a Configuration Manager (5200.40, E2.1.15, page 9; 8510.1-M, DL1.2.22, page 10).
but those roles are not directly involved in the SSAA.
DIACAP uses eight roles: PM or SM, DAA, CA, UR, CIO, PAA, SIAO, and IAM.
V
er
if
ic
at
io
n
E2.1.65. Verification. The process of deter-
mining compliance of the evolving IT system
specification, design, or code with the secu-
rity requirements and approach agreed upon
by the users, acquisition authority, and the
DAA. (5200.40, page 14)
(No definition provided in Interim-DIACAP.)
Because DITSCAP’s “validation” applies only to “completed” systems, DITSCAP needs a defi-
nition for testing incomplete systems.  DITSCAP’s “verification” fulfils that need.  DIACAP’s
“validation,” on the other hand, applies at any point in the life-cycle.  As a result, DIACAP
has no need of a DITSCAP-type definition for “verification.”
Table 14 DITSCAP/DIACAP Definitions  (Sheet 2 of 2)
Term DITSCAP DIACAP40
References
[1]  BSI - Bundesamt fur Sicherheit in der Informatinostechnik, IT Baseline Protection Manual,
PBSI 7152 E1. October 2003 version. 2,380 pages. http://www.bsi.bund.de/gshb.
[2]  Philip L. Campbell, “An Introduction to Information Control Models.”  SAND2002-0131. 82
pages.  Sandia National Laboratories.  Albuquerque, New Mexico.
[3]  Philip L. Campbell, “A CobiT® Primer.”  SAND2005-3455.  35 pages.  Sandia National Labo-
ratories.  Albuquerque, New Mexico.  Available on-line at www.itgi.org: click on “Introduction
to CobiT.”
[4]  Peter Checkland, Sue Holwell, Information, Systems, and Information Systems.  John Wiley
& Sons.  Chichester, England.  1998.  ISBN 0-471-95820-4.
[5]  COBIT: IT Governance Institute, CoBit 4.0: Control Objectives, Management Guidelines,
Maturity Models. December 2005. ISBN 1-933284-37-4. 207 pages.
(The latest version is “COBIT 4.0.”  The previous edition was “COBIT Third Edition” which
came out in 2000.  The second and first editions came out in 1998 and 1996, respectively.)
[6]  Common Criteria Implementation Board (CCIB) at NIST, Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation.” August 1999. Version 2.1. Part 1: Introduction and General
Model. CCIMB-99-031. 56 pages. Part 2: Security Functional Requirements. CCIMB-99-032. 354
pages. Part 3: Security assurance requirements. CCIMB-99-033. 208 pages.  http://csrc.nist.gov/
cc/ccv20/ccv2list.htm.
[7]  COSO: Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO),
“Internal Control—Integrated Framework.”  1992.  Available at www.cpa2biz.com.
[8] DCID 6/3: “Director of Intelligence Directive 6/3 Protecting Sensitive Compartmented Infor-
mation Within Information Systems.”  Manual.  99 pages.
[9]  DIACAP: “Interim Department of Defense Certification and Accreditation (C&A) Process
Guidance.”  “SUBJECT: DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process
(DIACAP).”  July 6, 2006.  57 pages.
[10] FIPS 199: Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 199: “Standards for Security Cat-
egorization of Federal Information and Information Systems.”  December 2003.
[11]  FISMA: The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (“FISMA”, 44 U.S.C. §
3541, et seq.) enacted in 2002 as Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107-347, 116
Stat. 2899).
[12]  IATF: “Information Assurance Technical Framework IATF).”  National Security Agency,
Release 3.1, September 2002, or latest  release. http://www.iatf.net.41
[13]  ISO/IEC 15408, Information Technology—Security techniques—Evaluation criteria for IT
security. Part 1: Introduction and general model. First edition 1999-12-01. 53 pages. Part 2: Secu-
rity functional requirements. First edition 1999-12-01. 343 pages. Part 3: Security assurance
requirements. First edition 1999-12-01. 213 pages.
[14]  ISO/IEC 17799:2005, “Information Technology—Code of Practice for Information Security
Management.” www.iso.org.
[15]  IT Governance Institute, Audit Guidelines.  July 2000.  226 pages.
Note: This document was written for COBIT 3rd Edition.  This document is being updated
for COBIT 4.0 and will be named IT Assurance Guide using COBIT.  The current document
supports “one generic audit process of control evaluation, compliance testing and substanti-
ating risk” [17].  The updated document will provide support for “additional assurance
techniques;” it will provide “more guidance” and will refer to the “full range of COBIT com-
ponents.”
[16]  IT Governance Institute, Control Practices. 2004.  223 pages.
Note: This document was written for COBIT 3rd Edition and has not yet be updated for
COBIT 4.0.
[17]  Gary Hardy, Erik Guldentops, “COBIT 4.0: The New Face of COBIT.”  Information Systems
Control Journal, Volume 6, 2005, pages 35-8.
[18]  Charles LeGrand et al., “Global Technology Audit Guide (GTAG), Guide 1: Information
Technology Controls.” The Institute of Internal Auditors. 76 pages. Available at www.theiaa.org.
[19] Leslie Ann Macartney, “Information Security Harmonisation: Classification of Global Guid-
ance.” IT Governance Institute. 2005. ISBN 1-933284-05-6. 150 pages. Available at www.itgi.org.
[20]  Mark W. Maier, Eberhardt Rechtin, The Art of Systems Architecting.  Second Edition.  CRC
Press.  Boca Raton, Florida.  2002.
[21]  Jimmy Heschl, “COBIT Mapping: Overview of International IT Guidance, 2nd Edition.” IT
Governance Institute. 2006. 75 pages.
[22] National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policy (NSTISSP)
No. 11, National Policy Governing the Acquisition of Information Assurance (IA) and IA-
enabled Information Technology Products. January 2000.
[23]  NIST, Common Criteria version 2: An Introduction. 10/98. 19 pages. http://csrc.nist.gov/
cc/info/infolist.htm.
[24] NIST 800-37: Ron Ross, Marianne Swanson, Gary Stoneburner, Stu Katzke, Arnold Johnson,
“Guide for the Security Certification and Accreditation of Federal Information Systems.”  NIST
Special Publication 800-37.  May 2004.  64 pages.42
[25] NIST 800-53: Ron Ross, Stu Katzke, Arnold Johnson, Marianne Swanson, Gary Stoneburner,
George Rogers, Annabelle Lee, “Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Sys-
tems.”  NIST Special Publication 800-53.  February 2005.  116 pages.
[26] NIST 800-60: William C. Barker, “Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information
Systems to Security Categories.”  NIST Special Publication 800-60.  June 2004.
Volume 1: Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to security
Categories.  William C. Barker.  45 pages.
Volume II: Appendices to Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Sys-
tems to security Categories.  William C. Barker, Annabelle Lee.  295 pages.43
This page intentionally almost blank.44
Appendix A  DITSCAP Phases, Activities, and Tasks, Based on
8510.1-M
Both 5200.40 and 8510.1-M describe Phases, Activities, and Tasks for DITSCAP.  (Neither 8500.1
nor 8500.2 discuss Phases, Activities, or Tasks.)  However, the descriptions in the two
documents differ (see Appendix B).  Because 8510.1-M provides more depth in its description, I
presume that it is the more authoritative source.  Accordingly, Table 15 below shows the 4
Phases, the 13 Activities, and the 35 Tasks in DITSCAP, as presented in 8510.1-M.
The Tasks, as described in 8510.1-M, are tightly associated with a Phase but only loosely
associated with an Activity: the number of each Task, e.g., “Task 1-2” (which is the second Task
in the first Phase), includes a Phase number but no reference to an Activity number.24  As a
consequence, the Activities for each Phase are listed in Table 15 independently of the Tasks.
The page number for the start of each item is included in the Table as a rough indication of the
space consumed in the description—by subtracting that number from the number for the
subsequent Task.  Most of the items take up only a page or two, but exceptions are notable.  For
example, Task 1-8 uses eight pages: that item describes the systems classification scheme.
24.  If the Tasks were tightly associated with an Activity, then I would expect to see three integers in the number of each Task, e.g.,
“Task 1-2-3” (which would be the third Task in the second Activity in the first Phase).45
Table 15 DITSCAP Phases, Activities, and Tasksa  (Sheet 1 of 2)
Phases (& Activities) Tasks
Phase 1. Definition (page 32)
Activities:
Preparation (page 35)
Registration (page 36)
Negotiation (page 38)
Task 1-1.  Review documentation (page 39)
Task 1-2.  Prepare the system and functional description and system
identification (page 39)
Task 1-3.  Register the system (page 42)
Task 1-4.  Prepare the environment and threat description (page 43)
Task 1-5.  Determine the system security requirements
(page 46)
Task 1-6.  Prepare the system architecture description
(page 50)
Task 1-7. Identify the C&A organizations and the resources required
(page 51)
Task 1-8.  Tailor the DITSCAP and prepare the DITSCAP plan (page
52)
Task 1-9.  Draft the SSAA (page 60)
Task 1-10.  Conduct certification requirements review
(page 61)
Task 1-11.  Establish agreement on level of effort and schedule (page
61)
Task 1-12.  Approve Phase 1 SSAA (page 61)
Phase 2. Verification
(page 65)
Activities:
SSA refinement (page 66)
System development and
integration (page 66)
Initial certification analysis
(page 66)
Assess analysis results (page
67)
Task 2-1.  System architecture analysis (page 68)
Task 2-2.  Software, hardware, and firmware design analysis (page
70)
Task 2-3.  Network connection rule compliance analysis
(page 74)
Task 2-4.  Integrity analysis of integrated products (page 77)
Task 2-5.  Life-cycle management analysis (page 79)
Task 2-6.  Security requirements validation procedures
(page 82)
Task 2-7.  Vulnerability assessment (page 84)46
Phase 3. Validation (page 90)
Activities:
SSAA refinement (page 91)
Certification evaluation of the
integrated system (page 91)
Recommendation to DAA
(page 92)
DAA accreditation decision
(page 93)
Task 3-1.  Security test and evaluation (ST&E) (page 94)
Task 3-2.  Penetration testing (page 97)
Task 3-3.  TEMPEST and RED-BLACK verification (page 99)
Task 3-4.  COMSEC compliance verification (page 101)
Task 3-5.  System management analysis (page 103)
Task 3-6.  Site accreditation survey (page 105)
Task 3-7.  Contingency plan evaluation (page 107)
Task 3-8.  Risk management review (page 108)
Phase 4. Post Accreditation
(page 112)
Activities:
System and security opera-
tion (page 113)
Compliance validation (page
114)
Task 4-1.  SSAA maintenance (page 115)
Task 4-2. Physical, personnel, and management control review (page
116)
Task 4-3.  TEMPEST evaluation (page 117)
Task 4-4.  COMSEC compliance evaluation (page 119)
Task 4-5.  Contingency plan maintenance (page 120)
Task 4-6.  Configuration management (page 121)
Task 4-7.  Risk management review (page 123)
Task 4-8.  Compliance validation (page 126)
a. This list is based on the material in 8510.1-M.
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Appendix B  DITSCAP Discrepancies
5200.40 and 8510.1-M differ materially in at least two respects—the list of DITSCAP Tasks and
the SSAA outline.  Each of these is presented in a separate section below.  Note that 8510.1-M
precedes 5200.40 in typical usage (see Section 2.3 on page 20).
B.1 Tasks
There are two lists of DITSCAP Tasks in 5200.40, and there are two lists of DITSCAP Tasks in
8510.1-M.  No two of the four lists agree.    (Neither 8500.1 nor 8500.2 discuss Phases, Activities,
or Tasks.)
Within 5200.40, of the eight Figures in Enclosure 3 that list Tasks, three of those Figures—
namely E3-4, E3-11, and E3-16—do not match the list of Tasks in Table 8-1 (pages 67-8), as
shown in Table 16 below.
In 8510.1-M, the Tasks in three of the four Tables in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 do not match the list
Table 16 5200.40 Discrepancies
Discrepancy Document Body Table 8-1 (pages 67-8)
Different
Wording
Task 4 in E3-4 (page 20), “Prepare the
system architecture description and
C&A boundary.”
“Prepare the system architecture
description.”
Task 7 in E3-4 (page 20), “Identify
organizations that will be involved in
the C&A and identify resources
required.”
“Identify organizations that will sup-
port the C&A.”
Task
Missing
Task 6 in Figure E3-11 (page 33), “Site
accreditation survey.”
(There is no corresponding Task in
Table 8-1.)
Task 5 in Figure E3-16 (page 40),
“Compliance reverification.”
(There is no corresponding Task in
Table 8-1.)
Different
Order
Task 1 in Figure E3-16 (page 40),
“Physical security analysis.”
Task 2 in Figure E3-16 (page 40),
“Review the SSAA.”
“Review the SSAA.”
“Physical security analysis.”
Task 3 in Figure E3-16 (page 40), “Risk-
based management review.”
Task 4 in Figure E3-16 (page 40), “Pro-
cedural analysis.”
“Procedural analysis.”
“Risk-based management review.”49
of Tasks in the bodies of those Chapters, as shown in Table 17 below.
Table 17 8510.1-M Discrepancies
Discrepancy Table Chapter Body
Different
Wording
Task 4 in C3.T3 (page 36), “Prepare the
system architecture description and
describe the C&A boundary.”
Task 1-6 (page 50), “Prepare the system
architecture description.”
Task 1-6 mentions describing the
“accreditation boundary” (see
C3.4.6.2.6).
Task 2 in C4.T1 (page 67), “Software
design analysis.”
Task 2-2 (page 70), “Software, hard-
ware, and firmware design analysis.”
Task 6 in C4.T1 (page 67), “Security
requirements validation procedures
preparation.”
Task 2-6 (page 82), “Security require-
ments validation procedures.”
Task Missing
A corresponding Task does not appear
in Table C3.T3 (page 36).
Task 1-1 (page 39), “Review documen-
tation.”
Task 7 in C6.T1 (page 114), “OSystem
[sic] Security Management.”
A corresponding Task does not appear
in pages 121-3, where the Task would
appear if it were present in the Chap-
ter body.
Different
Order
Task 4 in Table C3.T3 (page 36), “Pre-
pare system architecture description
and describe the C&A boundary.”
Task 5 in Table C3.T3 (page 36):
“Determine the system security
requirements.”
Task 1-5 (page 46), “Determine the sys-
tem security requirements.”
Task 1-6 (page 50), “Prepare the system
architecture description.”
Task 6 in C3.T3 (page 36), “Tailor the
DITSCAP tasks, determine the C&A
level of effort, and prepare a DITSCAP
plan.”
Task 7 in C3.T3 (page 36), “Identify
organizations that will be involved in
the C&A and identify resources
required.”
Task 1-7 (page 51), “Identify the C&A
organizations and the resources
required.”
Task 1-8 (page 52), “Tailor the
DITSCAP and prepare the DITSCAP
plan.”
Different
Description
Task 2 in C3.T4 (page 38), “Agree on
the security requirements, level of
effort, and schedule.”
Task 1-11 (page 61), “Establish Agree-
ment on Level of Effort and Schedule.”
Task 1-11 does not mention “security
requirements.”
Subsumption
The six Tasks in C6.T2 (page 114)—the title for the Table is “Compliance Valida-
tion Tasks”—are subsumed by Task 4-8 (page 126), “Compliance validation,” in
the Chapter body. (Table C6.T2 is repeated as Table C6.T5 (page 127), within the
description of Task 4-8.)50
B.2 SSAA Outline
An outline for the SSAA is presented in both 5200.40 (pages 51-5) and in 8510.1-M (pages 142-5).
The two outlines differ.  In general, the outline in 8510.1-M is a simplification of the outline in
5200.40.
The SSAA outline in 8510.1-M drops
1. the Hardware, Firmware, and Software sub-sections25 and the “TAFIM DGSA” sub-section
in Section 3 “SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE DESCRIPTION,”
2. all of  Section 4 “ITSEC SYSTEM CLASS,”
3. sub-sections under Section 5.5 “Network connection rules,” under Section 6.1. “Identifica-
tion of organizations,” and under Section 6.2 “Resources,” and
4. Section 6.4 “Roles and responsibilities,” and
5. Section 7.1.5 “Tailoring summary.”
The SSAA outline in 8510.1-M adds
1. eight sub-sections under Section 2.1 “Operating environment,” and
2. Section 3.1 “System Architecture Description.”
Of the 16 appendices in 5200.40, nine (Appendices B, C, D, E, I, J, L, M, and N) have the same
name in 8510.-1M and three more (Appendices A, K, and O) have almost the same name in
8510.1-M.  The remaining four appendices
•APPENDIX F. Certification results
•APPENDIX G. Risk assessment results
•APPENDIX H. CA’s recommendation
•APPENDIX P. Accreditation documentation and accreditation statement
do not easily match appendices in 8510.1-M.  The candidates from 8510.1-M are the following:
•Appendix P  Test and Evaluation Report(s)
•Appendix Q  Residual Risk Assessment Results
•Appendix R  Certification and Accreditation Statement
The matching that makes sense to me is shown in Table 18. Note that Appendix R is matched in
25.  I understand that these sub-sections—3.1, 3.2, and 3.3—should appear in an SSAA, even though 8510.1-M dropped them.51
Table 18 to both APPENDIX H and APPENDIX P.
8510.1-M adds two appendices:
•Appendix D  System Concept of Operations
•Appendix E  Information System Security Policy
Note that
•Appendix G  Certification Test and Evaluation Plan and Procedures (Type only)
is for “type” accreditation, as opposed to “site” (for co-located systems) and “system” (for a
single system).
The details of the differences are shown in Table 19.
Table 18 Matching Appendices
5200.40 8510.1-M
APPENDIX F. Certification results Appendix P  Test and Evaluation Report(s)
APPENDIX G. Risk assessment results Appendix Q  Residual Risk AssessmentResults
APPENDIX H. CA’s recommendation
Appendix R  Certification and Accreditation
StatementAPPENDIX P. Accreditation documentation
and accreditation statement
Table 19 SSAA Outlines in 5200.40 & 8510.1-M  (Sheet 1 of 4)a
5200.40 8510.1-M
1. MISSION DESCRIPTION AND SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION
1.1. System name and description.
1.2. System description.
1.3. Functional description.
1.3.1. System capabilities.
1.3.2. System criticality.
1.3.3. Classification and sensitivity of data
processed.
1.3.4. System user description and clearance
levels.
1.3.5. Life-cycle of the system.
1.4. System CONOPS summary.
2. ENVIRONMENT DESCRIPTION
2.1. Operating environment.
2.1.1. Facility Description
2.1.2. Physical Security52
2.1.3. Administrative Issues
2.1.4. Personnel
2.1.5. COMSEC
2.1.6. TEMPEST
2.1.7. Maintenance Procedures
2.1.8. Training Plans
2.2. Software development and maintenance
environment.
2.3. Threat description.
3. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURAL DESCRIP-
TION
3.1 Hardware.
3.2 Software.
3.3 Firmware.
3.1 System Architecture Description
3.4. System interfaces and external connec-
tions.
3.5. Data flow (including data flow dia-
grams).b
3.6. TAFIM DGSA, (reference (m)), security
view.
3.7. Accreditation boundary.
4. ITSEC SYSTEM CLASS
4.1. Interfacing mode.
4.2 Processing mode.
4.3 Attribution mode.
4.4. Mission-reliance factor.
4.5. Accessibility factor.
4.6. Accuracy factor.
4.7. Information categories.
4.8. System class level.
4.9. Certification analysis level.
5. SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
5.1. National and DoD security requirements.
5.2. Governing security requisites.
5.3. Data security requirements.
5.4. Security CONOPS.
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5.5. Network connection rules.
5.5.1. To connect to this system.
5.5.2. To connect to the other systems defined
in the CONOPS.
5.6. Configuration and change management
requirements.c
5.7. Reaccreditation requirements.
6. ORGANIZATIONS AND RESOURCES
6.1. Identification of organizationsd
6.1.1. DAA.
6.1.2. CA.
6.1.3. Identification of the user representative.
6.1.4. Identification of the organization
responsible for the system.
6.1.5. Identification of the program manager
or system manager.
6.2. Resources.
6.2.1. Staffing requirements.
6.2.2. Funding requirements.
6.3. Training for certification team.e
6.4. Roles and responsibilities.
6.5. Other supporting organizations or work-
ing groups.f
7. DITSCAP PLAN
7.1. Tailoring factors.
7.1.1. Programmatic considerations.
7.1.2. Security environment.
7.1.3. IT system characteristics.g
7.1.4. Reuse of previously approved solutions.
7.1.5. Tailoring summary.
7.2. Tasks and milestones.
7.3. Schedule summary.
7.4. Level of effort.
7.5. Roles and responsibilities.
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Note: The appendices in the 5200.40 column are listed below in the order of their appearance in
the 5200.40 outline, and the appendices in 8510.1-M that match the Appendices in 5200.40 have
been moved to highlight that matching, so the appendices in 8510.1-M do not appear in alpha-
betical order.
Note that Appendix R appears twice, across from both APPENDIX H and APPENDIX P.
Note also that appendices in 8510.1-M that do not appear to match any appendix in 5200.40,
such as Appendix D, are shown across from a grayed cell.
APPENDIX A. Acronym list Appendix A  Acronyms
APPENDIX B. Definitions Appendix B  Definitions
APPENDIX C. References Appendix C  References
APPENDIX D. Security requirements and/or
requirements traceability matrix
Appendix F  Security Requirements and/or
Requirements Traceability Matrix
Appendix D  System Concept of Operations
APPENDIX E. Security test and evaluation
plan and procedures
Appendix H  Security Test and Evaluation
Plan and Procedures
Appendix E Information System Security Pol-
icy
APPENDIX F. Certification results Appendix P  Test and Evaluation Report(s)
APPENDIX G. Risk assessment results Appendix Q  Residual Risk AssessmentResults
Appendix G Certification Test and Evaluation
Plan and Procedures (Type only)
APPENDIX H. CA’s recommendation Appendix R  Certification and AccreditationStatement
APPENDIX I. System rules of behavior Appendix J  System Rules of Behavior
APPENDIX J. Contingency plan(s) Appendix L  Contingency Plans
APPENDIX K. Security awareness and train-
ing plan
Appendix O  Security Education, Training,
and Awareness Plan
APPENDIX L. Personnel controls and techni-
cal security controls
Appendix M  Personnel Controls and Techni-
cal Security Controls
APPENDIX M. Incident response plan Appendix K  Incident Response Plan
APPENDIX N. Memorandums of agreement
— system interconnect agreements
Appendix N Memorandums of Agreement —
System Interconnect Agreements
APPENDIX O. Application system develop-
ment artifacts or system documentation
Appendix I  Applicable System Development
Artifacts or System Documentation
APPENDIX P. Accreditation documentation
and accreditation statement
Appendix R  Certification and Accreditation
Statement
a. This table uses the section numbering of 5200.40. So, for example, Section 3.4. “System
interfaces and external connections” of 5200.40 matches Section 3.2 of 8510.1-M.  Differing
section names are noted in footnotes.
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b. The name for this section in 8510.1-M is simply “Data Flow.”
c. The name for this section in 8510.1-M is simply “Configuration Management Require-
ments.”
d. The name for this section in 8510.1-M is simply “Organizations.”
e. The name for this section in 8510.1-M is simply “Training.”
f. The name for this section in 8510.1-M is simply “Other Supporting Organizations.”
g. The name for this section in 8510.1-M is “IS Characteristics.”56
Appendix C  DIACAP Role Fusion and Reporting Constraints
The purpose of this Appendix is to point out the gaps in a particular area in DIACAP. However,
those explicit gaps may be trivial for several reasons.  (1) The gaps might already be filled by
organizational structure not spelled out in DIACAP. (2) There may be plans to fill the gaps prior
to DIACAP being signed.  (3) The gaps might be “don’t cares” and either the footnote to this
effect has not yet been inserted or I have overlooked it.
This Appendix presents the constraints on two aspects of the eight roles defined in DIACAP
(see Section 4.4.2 on page 36).  First, it is permissible for a single person for certain roles for a
single information system to play more than one of these roles simultaneously.  I call this “role
fusion,” for lack of a better term.  Second, certain roles may or may not be allowed to report to
certain other roles. The constraints for these two aspects are expressed in a single table ([9],
Table E3.1, page 32).  Unfortunately neither set of constraints, as expressed in that one table, is
sufficient, so many questions are left unanswered.  Perhaps this will be rectified in a future
version of Interim-DIACAP.
In this Appendix, the constraints on role fusion are presented first, followed by the constraints
on reporting.
This information is relegated to an Appendix because I do not think it is necessary for an
understanding of DIACAP.  In addition, the material is confusing.
C.1 Role Fusion Constraints
DIACAP defines nine roles. Of the 36 role-pairs, role fusion constraints are provided for only 6,
as shown in Table 20.
Table 21 shows the constraints from Table 20 in the context of possible constraints.
Table 20 Role Constraints (Given)
Constraint
Numbera
a. The integer in this column is the num-
ber of the corresponding row in Table E3.1
([9], page 32).
Constraint
3 CIO may be DAA
4 DAA may be CA
6 PAA may be DAA
8 PM/SM may not be CA
9 PM/SM may not be DAA
10 PM/SM may not be UR57
Table 21 Role Constraintsa (Exhaustive)
PM/
SM
DAA CA UR CIO PAA SAIO IAM IAO
PM/SM No (9) No (8) No (10)
DAA Yes (4) Yes (3) Yes (6)
CA
UR
CIO
PAA
SAIO
IAMb
IAOc
a. Cell [i,j] addresses the following question: “May the role in row i and the role in column j be
played by the same person?”
It is not clear what the default is (i.e., if the cell is blank).
The parenthesized integers in various cells in this table refer to the constraint numbers shown in
Table 20.
b. Previously known as ISSM.
c. Previously known as ISSO.58
The role constraints are shown diagrammatically in Figure 4.
The role fusion constraints leave many questions unanswered.  For example, the constraints tell
us nothing about  SAIO, IAM, and IAO.  In addition, is it true that one person could play the
four roles of CA, DAA, CIO, and PAA? One hint about this is the definition of “DIACAP Team”
as consisting of seven “officials” at a minimum: DAA, CA, SIAO, PM or SM, IAM, UR, and IAO
([9], E.2.1.24, page 15).  If an “official” is a person and not a role, then this would imply that the
DAA and CA roles, at least, cannot fuse.  Which is it?
We can glean a little light on this matter from Section 5 “Responsibilities” of Interim-DIACAP.
This section informs us that (1) the SIAO functions as the CA for all systems governed by that
SAIO ([9], 5.13.4.1, page 8), (2) the CIO appoints the SAIO ([9], 5.12.1, page 7), and (3) the IAM
Figure  4 Role Constraints
IAMSIAO
UR
CA
DAA
CIO
PM or SM
Key:
“Clean” edge: source and
destination may fuse
Edge with X on it: source and
destination may not fuse
Integers are constraint numbers
(see Table 20)
PAA
3
4
6
9
8
10
IAO59
supports the PM or SM ([9], 5.17.1, page 10).
C.2 Reporting Constraints
Of the 36 reporting-pairs, reporting constraints are provided for only 10, as shown in Table 22.
Table 23 shows the constraints from Table 22 in the context of possible constraints.
Table 22 Reporting Constraints (Given)
Constraint
Numbera
a. The integer in this column is the number of the corresponding row in Table E3.1 ([9], page 32).
Constraint Comments
1 CA reports to DAA (See Constraints 7a and 7b.)
2 CA does not report to PM/SM
5 DAA does not report to PM/SM
7a PM/SM reports to DAA Constraint 7 reads “PM or SM and CA both
report to the DAA.”
This Constraint duplicates Constraints 1 and
13.
7b CA reports to DAA
11 PM/SM does not report to CA
12 PM/SM reports to CIO
13 PM/SM reports to DAA (See Constraints 7a and 7b.)
14 UR reports to CIO
15 UR does not report to PM/SM
16a UR reports to SIAO Constraint 16 reads “User Representative
reports to the SIAO/CA.”16b UR reports to CA60
Table 23 Reporting Constraintsa (Exhaustive)
PM/
SM
DAA CA UR CIO PAA SAIO IAM IAO
PM/SM
Yes
(7a, 13) No (11)
Yes
(12)
DAA No (5)
CA No (2)
Yes
(1, 7b)
Yes
(7a, 13)
UR No (15)
Yes
(16b)
Yes
(14)
Yes
(16a)
CIO
PAA
SAIO
IAM
IAO
a. Cell [i,j] addresses the following question: “May the role in row i report to the role in column j?”
It is not clear what the default is (i.e., if the cell is blank).
The parenthesized integers in various cells in this table refer to the constraint numbers shown in
Table 20.61
The reporting constraints are shown diagrammatically in Figure 5.
As with the role fusion constraints, the reporting constraints leave many questions unanswered.
For example, the constraints tell us nothing about reporting with respect to the IAM and PAA.
In addition, there is confusion between the role fusion constraints and the reporting constraints.
The role fusion constraints presented in Appendix C.1 suggest that the CA and DAA may be the
same person, but the reporting constraints do not allow PM/SM to report to CA while they do
allow PM/SM to report to DAA.  If for a given information system the CA and the DAA are the
same person, may PM/SM report to this person or not? or is the same person not allowed to
assume both the CA and DAA roles?
Figure  5 Reporting Constraints
IAMSIAO
UR
CA
DAA
CIO
PM or SM
Key:
“Clean” arc: source may report
to destination
Arc with X on it: source may
not report to destination
Integers are constraint numbers
(see Table 22)
PAA
16b16a
15
14
13, 7a
12
11
5
2 1, 7b
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Appendix D  Common Terms
Based on the assumption that the terms defined in a document suggest the focus of the
document, I selected 25 terms that appeared relevant and noted the documents that defined
those terms.26  Surprisingly, a definition for only one of my selected terms appears in all five
documents: DAA.
The number of shared terms for each of the 10 document pairs is shown in Table 24.
26.  5200.40 defines 67 terms;
8510.1-M defines 85 terms;
8500.1 defines 43 definitions;
8500.2 defines 55 terms; and
Interim-DIACAP defines 74 terms.
Table 24 Terms Shared by Document Pairs
Document Pairs Shared Terms Comments
5200.40
8510.1-M 14 Greatest numberof shared terms.
8500.1 5
8500.2 1 Least number ofshared terms.
Interim-DIACAP 6
8510.1-M
8500.1 6
8500.2 2
Interim-DIACAP 6
8500.1
8500.2 5
Interim-DIACAP 4
8500.2 Interim-DIACAP 563
The number of shared terms is shown diagrammatically in Figure 6.
There are three points that arise from Table 24 and Figure 6:
1. 5200.40 and 8510.1-M share the most number of terms—12—which is twice that shared by
any other document pair.
2. The number of terms that 8500.1 and that Interim-DIACAP individually share with other
documents varies the least of the documents.
3. The number of terms that 8500.2 shares varies the most of the documents.
One way to view Figure 6 is that 5200.40 and 8510.1-M present a cohesive story, that 8500.1
diverges from story, that 8500.2 diverges from even more, but Interim-DIACAP coalesces the
story.
The presence/absence of a definition in the five documents for the terms I selected is shown in
Table 25.
Figure  6 Term Sharing
5200.40
8500.1
8510.1-M
Interim-DIACAP
8500.2
Note: Distance between any two rectangles is inversely
proportional, roughly, to the number of terms shared by
the two respective documents.  So the rectangles that are
the closest together represent the document pairs that
share the most number of terms, and the rectangles that
are the farthest apart represent the document pairs that
share the least number of terms.64
Table 25 Shared Terms
Term
Does the Definition appear in this Document?
5200.40 8510.1-M 8500.1 8500.2
Interim-
DIACAP
Terms defined in all five documents
Designated Approving Authority
(DAA) Yes
Terms defined in any four documents
Information Assurance (IA) No Yes
Terms defined in any three documents:
Integrity
Yes
Yes No
Authenticity (or Authentication)
Availability
Confidentiality
Certification
No Yes
Accreditationa
Certification Authority (CA)b
Program Manager
IA Control
No Yes
Mission Assurance Categories
Terms defined in any two documents:
Accountabilityc
Yes No
Assurance
DITSCAP
System Security Authorization Agree-
ment (SSAA)
Verification (or Verification Phase)
Validation Yes No Yes
Robustness
No
Yes No
Confidentiality Level No Yes
Terms defined in any one document:
Non-Repudiation No Yes No
Safeguard
No
Yes No
Common Criteria
Impact Code
No Yes
Severity Code
a. or Accreditation Decision.
b. or Certifying Authority.
c. i.e., Authentication and Non-Repudiation.65
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Appendix E  Additional Documents
In order to provide context for the five documents reviewed in this report, this Appendix
summarizes three additional, related documents:
1. DCID 6/3 [8],
2. NIST 800-37 [24], and
3. COBIT® [5].
The “process,” “systems classification,” and “measurement standard” for each of these
additional documents is summarized in Table 26.
Summaries of additional relevant documents can be found elsewhere ([2], [18], [19]).
E.1 DCID 6/3
DCID 6/3 provides “uniform policy guidance and requirements for ensuring adequate
protection of certain categories of intelligence information [namely]…Sensitive Compartmented
Information and special access programs for intelligence under the purview of the DCI27” ([8],
1.A.1, pages 3-4).
DCID 6/3 defines “information assurance” more aggressively than the other documents
reviewed in this report:
Information Assurance: Information Operations28 that protect and
defend information and information systems by ensuring their
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation.29 This includes providing restoration of information systems
Table 26 Additional Documents
DCID 6/3 NIST 800-37 COBIT
Process 11 steps
4 phases with 10 tasks
and 31 subtasks
(None is provided.)
Systems
Classification
5 “Protection Levels” 12 categories from FIPS199 [10]
Measurement
Standard
80 “security features
and assurances,” orga-
nized into 36 areas
Controls from NIST
800-53 [25]
215 “control objec-
tives”
27.  DCI = Director of Central Intelligence.
28.  “Information Operations” is defined in turn as “Action taken to affect adversary information and information systems while
defending one’s own information and information systems” ([8], Appendix B).
29.  DCID 6/3 presumes such things as “utility, user accountability, authenticity, possession, currency and non-repudiation” to be
“some function” of confidentiality, integrity, and availability ([8], 1.H.3, page 6), thus providing the latter three provides the former
six.67
by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. ([8],
Appendix B)
E.1.1 Process for DCID 6/3
The DCID 6/3 way to “accredit an IS”30 ([8], 1.F, page 5) is to use the following 11 steps:
1. Determine Levels-of-Concern [see Appendix E.1.2.1];
2. Determine Protection Level [see Appendix E.1.2.2];
3. Determine Interconnected System Requirements [this is needed if a system is to connect to
another certified system, say, or it is a Web or file server, or it handles mobile code, or it
engages in “collaborative computing”31] and Administrative Requirements [these are
requirements for training, document marking, physical security, personnel security, etc.];
4. Identify Technical Security and Assurance Requirements [i.e., determine what controls
apply];
5. Determine Required Documentation and Testing Activities [this is a function of the
required controls];
6. Write the System Security Plan (SSP)32;
7. Validate Security in Place [i.e., verify that the required controls are in place (we test them in
the next step)];
8. Testing against Security Requirements;
9. Prepare Certification Package;
10. Forward Certification Package [to the DAA];
11. Accreditation Decision by DAA. ([8], 1.F.1-11, page 5)
Elsewhere in DCID 6/3 its “C&A process,” as opposed to the 11 steps presented above, is cast in
the mold of system development life-cycle phases.  The operations in each phase do not cleanly
correspond to the 11 steps, as shown in Table 27.
Multiple “separately accredited” systems may be connected to form an “interconnected IS.”
The terms of such a connection would be described in a document named the Interconnection
Security Agreement (ISA) to which the DAAs of the individual systems must agree for the ISA
to be in force.  Among other things, the ISA describes one or more “Controlled Interfaces” (e.g.,
firewalls) that adjudicate communication between the interconnected systems.
30.  IS = Information System.
31.  I think this is colloquially referred to as “groupware”.  It is different than “collaborative systems” such as the Internet [20].
32.  The SSP describes the planned or actual “operating conditions” of the system and its residual risk ([8], 1.F.6, page 5).  The SSP
appears to be similar to DITSCAP’s SSAA except that the “format and content of the SSP are at the discretion of the DAA” ([8], Appendix
C, emphasis in the original).68
E.1.2 Systems Classification for DCID 6/3
DCID 6/3 uses five partitions but it defines 62 partitions.  The “Level-of-Concern” for a system
consists of one of three “indicators” each for confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The High
confidentiality indicator decomposes into five “Protection Levels.” Hence there are 7 * 3 * 3 = 62
partitions.33  The Levels-of-Concern is presented first in the material below, followed by
Protection Levels, followed by a summary.
E.1.2.1 Levels-of-Concern
As noted above, the Level-of-Concern for a system consists of one of three indicators—High,
Medium, and Basic—each for confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  The Level-of-Concern
for confidentiality is presumed to be independent of integrity and availability, likewise for
integrity and for availability.  The Level-of-Concern for confidentiality is based on the
sensitivity of the information on the system.  The Level-of-Concern for integrity is based on the
“degree of resistance to unauthorized modification” ([8], 3.B.2.b, page 11) is required to protect
the information.  The Level-of-Concern for availability is based on the “degree of availability
required” (ibid.) for the information.
Table 27 DCID 6/3 Phases (Table 9.1,  [8], pages 57-8)a
Phase Operationsb Steps
Design and Development
Determine the category for the system.
Based on the category, determine security require-
ments.
Determine threats, vulnerabilities, risks, and counter-
measures.
Complete the “System Security Plan” (SSP).
1-6?
First Test and Evaluation
(T&E I)
Develop “Certification Test Plan and Test Procedures”
document. 7-8?
Second Test and
Evaluation (T&E II)
Make plans to rectify gaps identified by running the
tests described in the previous step.
Complete the “Certification Package.”
Obtain accreditation.
9-11?
Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) Re-certify and re-accredit if changes so warrant. Maybe 1-11
Disposal Securely dispose of system.
a. I have added the “Step” column at the right.
b. This is my own term—DCID 6/3 does not provide one—and I want to avoid “task” and
“activity” which would suggest a connection here to DITSCAP and DIACAP.
33. The document notes 16 other factors that are part of a “complete IS certification” ([8], page 56). There does not appear to be a for-
mal way provided for including those factors.69
E.1.2.2 Protection Levels
The High Level-of-Concern for confidentiality decomposes into five Protection Levels.
Protection Level 1 (abbreviated “PL1”) does not provide as much protection as PL2, and PL2
does not provide as much protection as PL3, and so on, with PL5 providing the most protection.
The five Protection Levels are defined based on three factors: required clearance(s), formal
access approval(s), and need-to-know, as shown in Table 28.
Table 28 Five Protection Levels
Protection Level
Required
Clearance(s)
Formal Access
Approval(s)
Need-To-Know
Processing
Modea
a. Processing Mode is one of the seven system characteristics described in 5200.40 and in 8510.1-
M.  This column is added to this table to show the parallel between DCID 6/3 and those docu-
ments, as well as to acclimate readers who are already familiar with the various Processing
Modes.
1 Allb
b. “All” means that all users have the required clearance(s) or the formal access approval(s)
or the need-to-know, depending upon the parameter, for all of the information on the
system.
Dedicated
2 All Somec
c. “Some” means that some users (at least one) do not have the required clearance(s) or
the formal access approval(s) or the need-to-know, depending upon the parameter, for all
of the information on the system.
System High
3 All Some Compartmented
4
Some
Multilevel
“all users have at
least a Secret
clearance”  ([8],
3.C.2.4,  page 12)
and there is Top
Secret informa-
tion in the system
5
Some
“at least one user
lacks any clear-
ance for access to
some of the infor-
mation on the IS”
([8], 3.C.2.5, page
12) and there is
Top Secret infor-
mation in the sys-
tem70
E.1.2.3 Summary
DCID 6/3 defines 7 * 3 * 3 = 62 partitions. However, the following passage
Since all systems accredited under the authority of this manual by definition
process intelligence information, all systems accredited under this manual must
be assigned a High Confidentiality Level-of-Concern. ([8], 3.B.2.a, page 11,
emphasis in the original)
lowers the number of partitions effectively to 5 * 3 * 3 = 45, because the Medium and Basic
confidentiality Levels-of-Concern are eliminated, leaving only the five Protection Levels.  And
the preceding passage, along with the following passage,
When a system has more than one kind of information in it [i.e., at least
two different indicators for the three categories, such as High for
confidentiality and Medium for integrity], the Level-of-Concern assigned
is the highest Level-of-Concern for any information on the system. ([8],
3.B.1.a, page 11, emphasis in the original).
lowers the number of partitions even further to 5 * 1 * 1 = 5, namely the five Protection Levels,
because the Medium and Basic indicators for both the integrity and availability Levels-of-
Concern are eliminated.  Nevertheless the DCID 6/3 provides “security features and assurance
requirements” ([8], 3.D.1, page 12) for all three indicators for both integrity and availability, as
well as for the five Protection Levels.  It is not clear why these additional features and
requirements are provided in the document but presumably it is for the same reason that the
document speaks of determining the Level-of-Concern for a system, as well as the Protection
Level, as part of application of DCID 6/3.34
E.1.3 Measurement Standard for DCID 6/3
DCID 6/3 provides lists of “security features and assurance requirements” for each Protection
Level and for each Level-of-Concern for integrity and availability.35  The “security features,”
sometimes referred to as “technical security features,” appear to be what the document calls
“protection mechanisms.”  The “assurance requirements,” sometimes simply “assurances,”
appear to be more procedural, including ways to determine that the protections are operating as
they should.  However, there does not appear to be a definition of any of these terms anywhere
in the document, including in the “Glossary of Terms” in Appendix B.
As an example of a “security feature,” the following is the first such item for Protection Level 1:
[Access1] Access control, including:
a. Denial of physical access by unauthorized individuals unless under
constant supervision of technically qualified, authorized personnel.
34. For example, at one point in the document we read, “Having determined the appropriate Levels-of-Concern and Protection Level
for an IS, the DAA next needs to…” ([8], 3.D.1, page 12).
35.  Explicitly missing from the document are security features and assurance requirements for Basic and Medium Confidentiality.71
b. Procedures for controlling access by users and maintainers to IS
resources, including those that are at remote locations. ([8], 4.B.1.a, page
14, emphasis in the original).
Other categories of security features include identification & authentication, parameter
transmission, recovery procedures, screen lock, session controls, data storage, and data
transmission.
As an example of “assurance requirements,” the following is the first such item for Protection
Level 1:
[Doc1] Documentation shall include:
a. A System Security Plan.
b. A Security Concept of Operations (CONOPS)…The CONOPS shall at a
minimum include a description of the purpose of the system, a description
of the system architecture,… ([8], 4.B.1.c, page 15, emphasis in the
original)
In general the security features and assurance requirements for higher Protection Levels are a
superset of those for lower Protection Levels, in the same way that the Checklists for 8510.1-M
are cumulative.  So, for example, for Protection Level 2 there is an “[Access2],” in addition to
“[Access1].”  However, for Identification and Authentication the pattern is different: there is an
“[I&A1]” for Protection Level 1 but for Protection Level 2 there is no “[I&A1]” but there are
“[I&A2],” “[I&A3],” and “[I&A4],” and for Protection Level 3 there is “[I&A2],” “[I&A4],” and
“[I&A5].”36
E.2 NIST 800-37
NIST 800-37 could be described as a mix of DITSCAP and DIACAP.  It has the phases of
DITSCAP and the simplicity of DIACAP, along with DIACAP’s simple Package, as opposed to
DITSCAP’s unwieldy SSAA.  I could see no mention in the document of either DITSCAP or
DIACAP in general or 5200.40, 8510.1-M, 8500.1, or 8500.2 in particular, although there is one
mention of DCID 6/3 in the glossary.
E.2.1 Process for NIST 800-37
NIST 800-37 describes a four-phase process that map cleanly to DITSCAP’s four phases and
36.  The tables in Appendix D that show these requirements are at odds with what appears in the body of the document.  For exam-
ple, Appendix D shows that [I&A1] is required for all five Protection Levels.72
almost as cleanly to DIACAP’s five activities, as shown in Table 29.
The work to be done in each phase, whether it be NIST 800-37, DITSCAP, or DIACAP, is
essentially the same.
NIST 800-37 partitions the four phases into 10 tasks and into 31 subtasks.
Meanwhile, NIST 800-37 uses a “security accreditation package” which consists of three parts:
1. the system security plan,
2. the security assessment report, and
3. the plan of action and milestones (Figure 2.3, page 22).
This is similar to the DIACAP Package in the simplicity of its categories and similarly unlike the
DITSCAP SSAA.
E.2.2 Systems Classification for NIST 800-37
NIST 800-37 notes that the “effort for security certification and accreditation…should be scalable
to the FIPS 199 security category of the information system” ([24], page 25), and each NIST 800-
37 subtask includes “Supplemental Guidance for Low-Impact Systems” but that is the extent of
the document’s use of a systems classification.
Note: FIPS 199 defines the following structure by which the “SC” (i.e., “security category”) of an
“information type” can be defined by the following structure:
SC information type = {(confidentiality, impact), (integrity, impact),
(availability, impact)},
where the acceptable values for potential impact are LOW, MODERATE,
HIGH, or NOT APPLICABLE” ([10], page 7, emphasis in the original)37
Table 29 NIST 800-37 Phase or Activity Names
Phase or Activity NIST 800-37 DITSCAP DIACAP
1 Initiation Definition Initiate and Plan C&A
2 Security Certification Verification Implement and ValidateAssigned IA Controls
3 Security Accreditation Validation
Make Certification
Determination &
Accreditation Decision
4 Continuous Monitoring Post Accreditation
Maintain Authority to
Operate and Conduct
Reviews
5 Decommission
37.  That is, “impact” is a placeholder that can be replaced with “LOW”, “MODERATE”, etc., for a given system.73
This creates 3 * 4 = 12 system categories.
E.2.3 Measurement Standard for NIST 800-37
NIST 800-37 does not include a list of controls.  Rather it refers to the controls in NIST 800-53
[25].
NIST 800-37 directs that the implementation for those controls be judged based on the phrase
shown in italics in the following passage:
Security certification is a comprehensive assessment of the management,
operational, and technical security controls in an information system
made in support of security accreditation to determine the extent to which
the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the
desired outcome with respect to meeting security requirements for the information
system. ([24], page 1, emphasis added)
The italicized phrase in the above passage appears at least 11 times in NIST 800-37 (on pages 1,
2, 8, 15, 18, 21, 32, 35, 35 (again), 37, and 45).
E.3 COBIT®
COBIT38 is focused on IT governance.  The organizational roles that are responsible for IT
governance and what IT governance is are both described in the following passage:
IT governance is the responsibility of executives and the board of
directors, and consists of the leadership, organisational structures and
processes that ensure that the enterprise’s IT sustains and extends the
organisation’s strategies and objectives. ([5], page 6, emphasis in the
original)
IT governance39 is a proper superset of security.  COBIT deals with efficiency, effectiveness,
reliability, and compliance, in addition to the usual security triumvirate of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability.40
COBIT describes itself well in the following two passages:
COBIT has been developed and is maintained by an independent, not-for-
profit research institute41, drawing on the expertise of its affiliated
association42 members, industry experts, and control and security
professionals.  Its content is based on continuous research into IT best
38. “COBIT,” “Information Systems Audit and Control Association”, “ISACA,” “IT Governance Institute”, and “ITGI”, are registered
trademarks, and “COBIT Online” is a trademark, of ISACA and the IT Governance Institute.
39.  Heschl provides a more succinct definition of IT governance: “the system by which the organisation’s IT is governed and con-
trolled” ([21], page 11).
40.  The four topics—efficiency, effectiveness, reliability, and compliance—appear also in COSO [7].
41.  The “IT Governance Institute” (ITGI) (www.itgi.org), established in 1998.74
practice and is continuously maintained43, providing an objective and
practical resource for all types of users. ([5], page 26)
COBIT is based on the analysis and harmonisation44 of existing IT
standards and best practices and conforms to generally accepted
governance principles.  It is positioned at a high level, driven by business
requirements, covering the full range of IT activities, and concentrating on
what should be achieved45 rather than how to achieve effective
governance, management and control.  Therefore, it acts an integrator of
IT governance practices and appeals to executive management; business
and IT management; governance, assurance and security professionals; as
well as IT audit and control professionals.  It is designed to be
complementary to, and used together with, other standards and best
practices. (ibid.)
Note that COBIT comes from a non-profit organization; it is continuously maintained; it is
intended to be universal in its applicability; it is based on current standards; it focuses on ends,
not means; it intends to be an integrator and complementary with other standards—all aspects
which distinguish it from the seven other documents46 reviewed in this report.47
The sections below—Process, Systems Classification, and Measurement Standard—follow the
pattern for the review of the other documents in this report.  However, the bulk of the
information is in the last section.  (A general introduction to COBIT is available [3].)
E.3.1 Process for CoBIT
The presence of COBIT’s set of control objectives (see Appendix E.3.3) enables the following
“certification” conversation:
System Owner: We satisfy this control objective by implementing those controls.
Auditor: Based on the evidence I have gathered, my evaluation of your implementation of
those controls is that they are {Choose one: inadequate, adequate} to satisfy this control
objective.
However, COBIT is focused on governance, not certification.  COBIT does not provide a process
that compares with the phases, tasks, and subtasks provided by the other documents reviewed
in this report.  (Note that the above “conversation” does not address the importance (or
unimportance) of the control objective in the context of the organization’s overall objectives.)
42.  ISACA (www.isaca.org), formerly the “Information Systems Audit and Control Association,” grew out of the EDP Auditors
Foundation, established in 1969.
43.  See “COBIT Online” at www.itgi.org.
44.  e.g., Macartney [19].
45.  via the use of “control objectives” (see Appendix E.3.3).
46.  namely 5200.40, 8510.1-M, 8500.1, 8500.2, DIACAP, DCID 6/3, and NIST 800-37.  (DIACAP may prove to be the exception con-
cerning being continuously maintained.)
47.  In March 2005 COBIT was selected by the Commission of the European Communities (EC) as one of three “internationally
accepted standards to be used to provide information security and control of its agricultural paying agencies” ([17], page 35).  (The
other two standards are ISO 17799 [14] and BSI [1].)75
E.3.2 Systems Classification for CoBIT
COBIT provides no systems classification.  A classification could be developed based on COBIT.
For example, systems could be classified based on the “maturity,” measured on a scale of 0-5
(described in Appendix E.3.3.1) for each of the 34 processes  (see Appendix E.3.3).  However,
such a systems classification note is explicitly not the purpose of COBIT’s Maturity Model.
E.3.3 Measurement Standard for CoBIT
COBIT consists, essentially, of 215 control objectives defined as follows:
A statement of the desired result or purpose to be achieved by
implementing control procedures in a particular process. ([5], page 191)
Control procedures—or simply controls—are defined as follows:
The policies, procedures, practices and organisational structures designed
to provide reasonable assurance that the business objectives will be
achieved and undesired events will be prevented or detected ([5], page
191).
COBIT organizes its set of 215 control objectives into 34 “processes,” organized, in turn, into four
“domains.”  In addition, at the other end of the hierarchy, there are 1,547 “Control Practices,”
beneath the control objectives.  The hierarchy is shown in Table 30.
The four domains are named as follows, with the abbreviation for each shown in parentheses:
•Plan and Organise (PO),
•Acquire and Implement (AI),
•Deliver and Support (DS), and
•Monitor and Evaluate (ME).
The four domains correspond to “plan, build, run and monitor” ([5], page 14), respectively, or
Table 30 COBIT’s Control Objective Hierarchy
Level Name
Number of Elements
at this Level
1 Domain 4
2 Processa
a. Also known as “High-Level Control Objective.”
34
3 Control Objectiveb
b. Also known as “Detailed Control Objective” to distinguish from “High-
Level Control Objective.”
215
4 Control Practice 1547c
c. The number shown here is for the previous version of COBIT, the “3rd
Edition.”  The Control Practices have not yet been converted to COBIT 4.0.76
Deming’s plan-do-check-act (PDCA) cycle.
To give a flavor of control objectives, several examples are shown below. The fifth process in the
“Deliver and Support” domain is DS5, named “Ensure Systems Security.”48  The first two
control objectives are as follows:
DS5.1 Management of IT Security
Manage IT security at the highest appropriate organisational level, so the
management of security actions is in line with business requirements.
DS5.2 IT Security Plan
Translate business information requirements, IT configuration,
information risk action plans and information security culture into an
overall IT security plan. The plan is implemented in security policies and
procedures together with appropriate investments in services, personnel,
software and hardware.  Security policies and procedures are
communicated to stakeholders and users.  ([5], page 120, emphasis in the
original)
The first two Control Practices under DS5.1 are as follows:
1. The need to prepare and maintain a technological strategic and tactical
security plan is laid out in a policy.
2. The responsibility for the preparation, maintenance and approval of
such strategic and tactical security plans (including succession plans) is
identified, and the required skills for this task are available within the
organisation.  Senior management from across the organisation is
involved. ([16], page 130)
The second process in the “Monitor and Evaluate” domain is ME2 “Monitor and Evaluation
Internal Control.”  The control objectives within this process provide direction for what the
other documents in this report call “certification.”  The names of the control objectives in that
process are as follows:
•ME2.1 Monitoring of Internal Control Framework
•ME2.2 Supervisory Review
•ME2.3 Control Exceptions
•ME2.4 Control Self-assessment
•ME2.5 Assurance of Internal Control
•ME2.6 Internal Control at Third Parties
•ME2.7 Remedial Actions
ITGI has produced a set of “Audit Guidelines” [15] to assist in this task.  Guidelines are
48. I have chosen to show the control objectives from this process, instead of the first one in COBIT, to align with the focus of the other
documents in this report, namely security.77
provided for each process.  Included in the guidance is direction on whom to interview and
what documents to obtain, what to consider when evaluating the controls, what to test, and
how to evaluate the current risk.
The ME domain provides additional direction, as noted by the names of the three other
processes in that domain:
•ME1 Monitor and Evaluate IT Performance
•ME3 Ensure Regulatory Compliance
•ME4 Provide IT Governance
COBIT can be overwhelming, so ITGI has provided a beginner’s document entitled “COBIT
Quickstart.”
To enable measurement, COBIT provides a “Maturity Model” and performance goals and
metrics.  Each of these will be described in the next two sections.
E.3.3.1 Maturity Model
COBIT provides a “Maturity Model” along the lines developed by the Software Engineering
Institute (SEI) for software development capability.  There are six levels in the model:
0. Non-existent
1. Initial / Ad Hoc
2. Repeatable but Intuitive
3. Defined Process
4. Managed and Measurable
5. Optimised
COBIT includes a description of maturity at each level for each of the 34 processes.  COBIT’s
maturity model is not for certification and thus is different than the models presented in the
other documents reviewed in this report, as noted in the following passage:
The COBIT maturity model focuses on capability, but not necessarily on
performance.  They are not a number for which to strive, nor are they
designed to be a formal basis for certification levels with discrete levels
that create thresholds that are difficult to cross.  However, they have been
designed to be always applicable, with levels that provide a description an
enterprise can recognise as best fitting its processes.  The right level is
determined by the enterprise type, its environment and strategy. ([5], page
21)
Note that maturity is a function of cost vs. benefit and involves due diligence.78
E.3.3.2 Performance Goals and Metrics
COBIT describes Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) (i.e., metrics) for activities within a process
that drive Key Goal Indicators (KGI) (i.e., goals) in the process, and KPIs within the process that
drive the IT organization, as suggested in Figure 7 ([5], page 121).
Figure  7 Some Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and Key Goal Indicators (KGI)
IT KPI: number of systems where security requirements are not met
IT KGI: Ensure critical and confidential information is withheld from
those who should not have access to it.
Process KPI: number and type of suspected and actual access violations
Process KGI: Permit access to critical and sensitive data only to
authorized users.
Activity KGI: Managing user identities and authorisations in a
standardised manner.
Activity KPI: number of access rights authorised, revoked, reset or
changed
the KGI below is measured (in part) by the KPI above
the KPI below is one of the drivers for the KGI above
the KPI below is one of the drivers for the KGI above
the KGI below is measured (in part) by the KPI above
the KGI below is measured (in part) by the KPI above79
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